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I. INTRODUCTION 
State and federal water policies have traditionally accepted eco- 
nomic development as a principal objective.1 Federal transportation, 
hydropower generation, and reclamation policies have been perceived 
as instrumental in helping a developing nation reach its economic po- 
tential. Because these economic development objectives have been 
largely achieved, public concern in recent years has changed from the 
development of natural resources to a greater emphasis on their pro- 
tection and preservation-2 Enactment of federal and state environ- 
mental legislation reflecting these more recent concerns has resulted 
in inconsistent federal and state water policies. Emphasis on imple- 
menting reclamation, flood control, and hydropower production pro- 
grams has changed to accommodate environmental objectives, 
although integration of development and environmental objectives is a 
continuing struggle. In addition, federal taxing and budget constraints 
have triggered a greater interest in governmental efficiency and re- 
duced public expenditures. Consequently, federal water development 
programs are being subjected to closer budget scrutiny. 
Nebraska's water policies have paralleled federal policies. Histori- 
cally Nebraska water law has sought to facilitate private and public 
irrigation development. The irrigation crusade of the 1880s 
culminated in the adoption of the irrigation code of 1895, which re- 
mains the foundation of Nebraska surface water law. Federal adoption 
of the 1902 Reclamation Act provided federal financial subsidies for 
public irrigation projects. Nebraska adopted the required irrigation 
district, reclamation district, and public power district organization 
statutes to allow irrigators to participate in federal irrigation projects, 
Initially, federal reclamation policies of subsidizing public irriga- 
tion projects could be justified as encouraging the settlement and agri- 
cultural development of what was considered to be a vast wasteland. 
1. B. HOLMES, HISTORY OF FEDERAL WATER RESOURCES PROGRAMS AND POLICIES, 
1961-70, a t  1800-1960 (US. Dep't of Agric., Misc. Pub. No. 1233) (1972) Fereinaf- 
ter cited as H o ~ h i ~ s  I]. 
2. B. HOLMES, HISTORY OF FEDERAL WATER RESOURCES PROGRA~~S ND POLICIES, 
1961-70 (U.S. Dep't of Agric., Misc. Pub. No. 1379) (1979) bereinafter cited as 
H o ~ n ~ s  II]. 
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During the Depression, reclamation policies were subsumed by larger 
federal public works programs in an effort to stimulate employment. 
In the postwar period reclamation policies enjoyed broad political sup- 
port. However, the environmental movement of the 1970s and the fed- 
eral budget constraints of the 1980s have dealt sigmficant blows to 
traditional federal reclamation policies. 
Nebraska participated in public irrigation project development 
during the golden era of water development. However, the 1936 Oster- 
man restriction on interbasin transfers3 constrained federal project 
development until the 1980 Little Blue I4 case authorized transbasin 
diversions. At the same time, farmers developed the plentiful ground 
water resources of Nebraska to increase total irrigated acreage to sev- 
eral times what could be supplied by streams and impoundments 
alone. This intensive ground water development led to declining 
ground water supplies in many areas of Nebraska. The threat of 
ground water depletion has led local irrigators to seek "rescue 
projects," i.e., public irrigation projects to supply the irrigation water 
lost to ground water depletion. When Little Blue I opened the Platte 
River to development by irrigators outside the Platte valley, the race 
for Platte River water began. 
However, state and federal environmental and financial policy 
changes have made it more difficult to develop the Platte (and other 
Nebraska rivers) for irrigation: the golden age of water development 
has already passed. President Carter's water project hit list and pro- 
posed water policy reforms have resulted in significantly reduced fed- 
eral financial assistance for public irrigation projects. In addition, 
Little Blue 11 ruled that water projects must comply with state endan- 
gered species statutes.5 This decision highlighted a bitter conflict be- 
tween water developers and environmentalists and brought water 
development in Nebraska to a standstill. 
To break this water development logjam, Nebraska Governor Bob 
Kerrey appointed a "Water Independence Congress" in 1983 to recom- 
mend new water policies to accommodate water development and en- 
vironmental concerns, and to adapt to new federal water financing 
policies. Water Congress recommendations were adopted in 1984 and 
resulted in the creation of a Water Management Board to oversee and 
promote water project development in Nebraska. 
This Article will trace the development of Nebraska and federal 
water development policies with special reference to the appropriate- 
3. Osterman v. Cent. Neb. Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 131 Neb. 356,268 N.W. 334 
(1936). 
4. Little Blue Natural Resources Dist. v. Lower Platte North Natural Resources 
Dist., 206 Neb. 535, 294 N.W.2d 598 (1980) [Little Blue I]. 
5. Little Blue Natural Resources Dist. v. Lower Platte North Natural Resources 
Dist., 210 Neb. 862, 317 N.W.2d 726 (1982) [Little Blue II] .  
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ness of publicly subsidized rescue projects to cope with ground water 
depletion. 
11. DEVELOPMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL WATER 
DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 
A. Appropriation and Reclamation: 1867-1929 
Historically the major emphasis of Nebraska water law has been 
on facilitating irrigation development. The first step was replacing the 
common law riparian doctrine with the statutory surface water alloca- 
tion doctrine of prior appropriation. Under the riparian doctrine, each 
owner of land bordering a natural stream or lake has the coequal right 
to make a reasonable use of water flowing past his property.6 Ripa- 
rian conflicts are resolved through private litigation, the outcome of 
which is not easily predictable.7 The riparian doctrine does not facili- 
tate irrigation for three main reasons: (1) nonriparians are not enti- 
tled to use streamflow,s (2) litigation is a costly and uncertain way to 
determine rights when water supplies are inadequate,g and (3) dor- 
mant riparian rights could be exercised to the detriment of existing 
riparian (and nonriparian) uses.10 In contrast, appropriative water 
rights are more certain. Water may be used on nonriparian land, the 
amount of water is fixed, and new users take subject to existing 
6. Wasserberger v. Coffee, 180 Neb. 149,141 N.W.2d 738 (1966). See Comment, 2% 
Dual-System of Water Rights in Nebraska, 48 NEB. L. REV. 488 (1969) [hereinaf- 
ter Dual-System]. 
7 .  See R. HAF~NSBERGER & N. THORSON, EBRASKA WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRA- 
TION 19-22 (1984). 
8. In public irrigation projects most of the land irrigated will often be land located 
near the stream or reservoir. The river valley land may often be the best suited 
for irrigation. In addition, the closer the land to be irrigated is to the source of 
supply, the less costly is the delivery of irrigation water. However, restricting 
water use to riparian land would prevent most of the land within a river valIey 
from being irrigated because the land tract was not physically contiguous to the 
stream. 
9. In the West, precipitation, and therefore streamflow, is irregular. However, the 
need for supplemental irrigation water vrill be greatest during periods of low pre- 
cipitation, and therefore, periods of low streamflow: the need for water will be 
greatest when the supply is the lowest. Thus, regular and predictable resolution 
of the inevitable water use confIicts is important. Under the riparian doctrine 
disputes are resolved by private litigation, the nature of which does not promote 
predictability. In resolving riparian disputes Nebraska courts are likely to bal- 
ance the equities by following the Restatement of Torts. See Wasserberger v. 
Coffee, 180 Neb. 149, 141 N.W.2d 738 (1966); HAF~NSBERGER & THORSON, sum 
note 7, at  54-57. 
10. Riparian rights are not lost by nonuse. 2 H. FARNHARI, THE LAW OF WATERS AND 
WATER RIGHTS 3 463 (1904). Riparians may initiate new uses at any time which 
may interfere with existing uses, thus adding an additional element of uncer- 
tainty to the riparian system. 
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users.11 The appropriation doctrine was developed to remedy the de- 
fects of the riparian doctrine in an arid environment. Thus replace- 
ment of the riparian doctrine with the appropriative doctrine was the 
first step to facilitate private irrigation development in Nebraska.* 
The Nebraska Supreme Court decisively rejected the appropriative 
doctrine in several early cases.13 The unacceptable legal uncertainty 
resulting from riparian rights jeopardized the significant investment 
required for irrigation, and led to a political crusade to adopt appropri- 
ation statutes to promote surface water irrigation in Nebraska.14 Sub- 
sequent statutory development included the irrigation acts of 1877 and 
1889, and the 1895 irrigation code which is the basis of current appro- 
priation statutes. 
In 1877 the Nebraska Legislature took the first step towards the 
legal recognition of prior appropriation by enacting a brief statute giv- 
ing corporations organized for irrigation purposes the power of con- 
demnation to acquire rights of way for canals, dams and resemoirs.l5 
The 1889 irrigation act explicitly recognized the doctrine of prior ap- 
propriation.16 The act adopted the principle of priority: "As between 
appropriators the first one in time is the first one in right."l7 The 
procedure for appropriating water was reminiscent of the customs de- 
veloped in the mining camps of the California gold rush28 To appro- 
11. Trelease, Law, Water and People: The Rok of Water Law in Conserving and 
Developing NaturaZ Resources in the West, 18 WYO. L.J. 3 (1963). 
12. For a more complete discussion of the inappropriateness of the riparian doctrine 
to foster irrigation, see Trelease, supra note 11; Fischer, Harnsberger & Oeltjen, 
Rights to Nebraska Streamjlflozos: An Historical Overuiew with Recomntendn- 
tions, 52 NEB. L. REV. 313,339-40 (1973); R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra 
note 7, at 122-25. 
13. Clark v. Cambridge & Arapahoe Irrigation & Improvement Co., 45 Neb. 798, 64 
N.W. 239 (1895); Meng v. Coffee, 67 Neb. 500,93 N.W. 713 (1903). For citations of 
earlier non-irrigation cases see 1 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES 
138-40, n.12 (3d ed. 1911). 
14. For an excellent account of this irrigation crusade see Fischer, Harnsberger & 
Oeltjen, supra note 12, at 342-48. 
15. Act of February 19, 1877, Ch. 16, $158 Neb. Laws 168 {repealed 1889). See 
Fischer, Harnsberger & Oeltjen, supra note 12, at  333-34; HARN~BERGER & THOR 
SON, supra note 7, at 64. While the 1877 Act did not explicitly provide a procedure 
for acquiring appropriative water rights, the Nebraska Supreme Court subse- 
quently ruled that a common law appropriative procedure was implied. Kearney 
Water & Elec. Powers Co. v. Alfalfa Irrigation Dist., 97 Neb. 139, 149 N.W. 363 
(1914). That is, an appropriator acquired his right by diverting water and apply- 
ing it to a beneficial use. 
16. Act of March 27, 1889, ch. 68, $9 1-15, 1889 Neb. Laws 503 hereinafter 1889 Act]. 
See Fischer, Harnsberger & Oeltjen, supra note 12, at 334-40; R. HARNSBERGER & 
N. THORSON, supra note 7, at 64-67. 
17. 1889 Act, $ 7 (currently codified at NEB. REV. STAT. 9 46-203 (1984)). 
18. For an excellent account of the California gold rush and its impact on the devel- 
opment of the appropriation doctrine, see McGowen, The Development of Polit- 
ical Institutions on the Public Domain, 11 WYO. L.J. 1 (1956). 
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priate water one was required to post a notice in writing in a 
conspicuous place at the point of diversion stating (1) a claim specify- 
ing the amount of water to be diverted and a description of the point of 
diversion, (2) the purpose for which water would be used and the place 
of use, and (3) the size and type of diversion works.19 A copy of the 
notice was required to be filed with the local county clerk within ten 
days of its being posted.20 The claimant was required to begin con- 
struction of his diversion works and "prosecute the work diligently 
and uninterruptedly to completion unless temporarily interrupted by 
snow or rain."2l If the claimant complied with these rules his priority 
date related back to the posting of the notice.22 Failure to comply with 
these provisions worked a loss of priority as against a subsequent ap- 
propriator who complied with the rules.23 The act also recognized 
prior common law appropriations.% 
A significant limitation of the 1889 act was its failure to provide an 
administrative mechanism for supervising the grant and exercise of 
appropriations.25 Thus priority among appropriators had to be en- 
forced through private litigation. Determining the priority and extent 
of rights was difficult as records were kept at the county level, rather 
than on a state-wide basis. A prospective irrigator would have needed 
to search the county records to the source of the stream to determine 
his relative priority. 
While the 1889 act was little more than codification of common law 
appropriation principles, the 1895 irrigation code created a compre- 
hensive administrative system for acquiring and administering water 
rights.26 The 1895 code replaced the 1889 system of acquiring an ap- 
propriation by use with an administrative system, administered by the 
19. 1889 Act, $8 (repealed 1895). 
20. Id 
21. Id at 5 9. 
22. Id  at 8 11. This is the beginning of the important "relation back" doctrine under 
which an appropriator's priority date relates back to when the work on the appro- 
priation was initiated so long as  the diversion was completed with "due dili- 
gence." See infra note 39. 
23. 1889 Act, 4 12 (repealed 1985). 
24. Id at 8 11. The act also abrogated rip- rights on streams wider than 50 feet. 
Id 5 1. This was amended in 1893 to apply only to streams wider than 20 feet. 
Act of March 31,1893, ch. 40,§ 1,1893 Neb. Laws 377 (repealed 1895) bereinafter 
1893 Act]. The provisions restricting riparian rights were held invalid in Clark v. 
Cambridge and Arapahoe Irrigation &Improvement Co., 45 Neb. 798,64 N.W. 239 
(1895). 
25. Fischer, Harnsberger & Oeltjen, supra note 12, at  337-38; HARNSBERGER & THOR 
SON, supra note 7, at  67. 
26. Act of April 4, 1895, ch. 69, $8 1-69, 1895 Neb. Laws 244 (codified as amended at 
NEB. REV. STAT. $46-201 to -263 (1984)) [hereinafter 1895 Act]. See Fischer, 
Harnsberger & Oeltjen, supra note 12, at 348-58; R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, 
supra note 7, at 6473. The Nebraska statute was patterned after Wyoming's ap- 
propriation statute, which was the first to establish an agency to grant and admin- 
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state board of irrigation (now the Department of Water Resources), 
for acquiring new appropriations and for administering appropria- 
tions.27 The establishment of an administrative agency to grant and 
administer appropriative rights is the most significant aspect of the 
1895 code. Appropriations could be acquired only by filing with the 
board of irrigation,28 which was authorized to deny a permit if a 
stream were over-appropriated, or if granting the permit was not in 
the public interest.29 Appropriation records were centralized with the 
board of irrigation, making the investigation of outstanding appropria- 
tive rights much simpler. Finally, resolution of appropriative disputes 
was made an administrative function.30 Relative priorities were estab- 
lished through adjudication of existing rights31 or when the permit 
was filed with the board of irrigation for new rights.32 The board also 
adjudicated the quantity of water to which an appropriator was enti- 
tled.33 These issues would no longer be required to be determined 
through litigation. Similarly, a senior appropriator could notify the 
board of irrigation when he was not receiving the quantity of water he 
was entitled to divert, rather than suing the upstream junior appropri- 
ator. Thus the basis for resolving appropriative disputes was clarified 
and an administrative mechanism for resolving such disputes on a rou- 
tine basis was established.34 
The significance of the 1895 irrigation code in encouraging irriga- 
ister appropriations. Fischer, Harnsberger & Oeltjen, supra note 12, at 347; R. 
HARN~BERGER & N. RIoRSON, supra note 7, at  69-70. 
27. 1895 Act, $ 4 (repealed 1919) (state board of irrigation established); $5  19-27 (adju- 
dicating existing claims); $5 28-31 (procedures for new appropriations). See 
Fischer, Harnsberger & Oeltjen, supra note 12, at 349-54; R. HARNSBERGER & N. 
T ~ O R S ~ N ,  supra note 7, a t  70-73. For a discussion of current appropriation proce- 
dures see id at 73-86. 
28. 1895 Act, 5 28 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. 3 46-233 (1984)). 
29. Id (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. $9 46-234 to -235 (1984)). 
30. 1895 Act, $50 (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. 5 46-263 (1984)). For a 
good discussion of problems in administering priorities see R. HARNSBERGER & N.
THORSON, supra note 7, at  92-97. 
31. 1895 Act, $$ 16, 19-25 (codified, as amended, at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-226 to -231 
(1984)). See Fischer, Harnsberger & Oeltjen, supra note 12, at  350-52. 
32. 1895 Act, 5 31 (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. $46-205 (1984)). 
33. Id $ 28 (new appropriations); $20 (adjudicated appropriations) (codified as 
amended at NEB. REV. STAT. $ 46-231 (1984)). See R. HARNSBERGER & N. THoR- 
SON, supra note 7, at  78-80. 
34. The 1895 irrigation code also cut off the acquisition of new riparian rights as of 
the act's effective date, April 4, 1895. But it did not provide a specific means for 
resolving riparian-appropriative disputes involving those riparian rights which 
had already vested. See Wasserburger v. Coffee, 180 Neb. 149, 141 N.W.2d 738 
(1966); Dual-System, supra note 6; Fischer, Harnsberger & Oeltjen, supra note 12, 
at  358-63; R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at  97-112. 
For a useful analysis of Nebraska's prior appropriation system see Yeutter, A 
Legal-Economic Critique of Nebraska Watercourse Law, 44 NEB. L. REV. 11 
(1965). 
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tion development cannot be overstated. The code was absolutely nec- 
essary to developing large scale irrigation projects in Nebraska. Those 
wishing to develop individual or collective irrigation projects had all 
the legal tools they needed to obtain secure water rights for their pro- 
ject. Prior to making any investment the prospective irrigators could 
survey the stream to determine the number of appropriators and the 
quantity of their claims. This allowed the prospective appropriator to 
determine the likelihood of water being available to him if he obtained 
an appropriation. An appropriation would have a fixed quantity and 
priority date rather than having a coequal right to share a stream with 
other users.35 Perhaps the most significant change was the adminis- 
tration of priorities. No longer would a senior appropriator be re- 
quired to obtain a court order to close an upstream junior's headgate 
when the senior needed the water. A call to the Department of Water 
Resources (DWR) would result in an immediate investigation and, 
usually, the issuance of closing orders to the junior appropriator.36 
These changes were significant both for individual irrigators and 
for those wishing to promote collective irrigation projects. The earli- 
est appropriations tended to be natural flow appropriations,37 i.e., 
rights to divert water directly from the stream. As natural flow ap- 
propriations use the reliably available streamflow, later appropriators 
are required to incorporate water storage into their irrigation projects 
to obtain a secure water supply. Thus storage appropriations are used 
to store water during the non-irrigation season for use during the sum- 
mer months.38 The ability to make a realistic legal evaluation of 
stream conditions and existing uses, and to obtain water rights with 
fixed quantities and priorities which would be administratively en- 
forced, provided the security necessary to encourage irrigation devel- 
opment.39 If irrigation projects would fail, it would be primarily 
35. As Trelease has noted, "an equal share of water that was insufficient for all 
would lead to a parceling out of the waters in shares that were sufficient for no 
one." Trelease, supra note 11, a t  9. 
36. When DWR personnel investigate to determine whether an upstream junior is 
diverting water which a downstream senior needs, the DWR ditch rider will first 
determine how much water the junior is diverting The junior may be diverting 
more than allowed by his appropriation permit. If restricting the junior to his 
authorized rate of diversion will release enough streamflow for the senior, the 
junior will not be issued a cIosing order. If the streamflow to the senior is still 
inadequate, however, the closing order will be issued. When the senior has di- 
verted as much as he is entitled to, the junior will again be allowed to resume 
diversions. 
37. For a discussion of how the priority rule encourages junior appropriators to ob- 
tain secure rights to water by developing storage see Trelease, supra note 11, a t  9- 
10. 
38. For a discussion of the difference between natural flow appropriations and stor- 
age appropriations, and the difference in their administration, see R. HARNs  
BERGER & N. TI-IoRSON, SUWLZ note 7, at  74-84. 
39, Proposed irrigation projects created an element of uncertainty for prospective 
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because available streamflow was overestimated,40 not because water 
rights were insecure or difficult to enforce.41 
In addition to the appropriation code, irrigation district legislation 
was enacted in 1895.42 The irrigation district act provided the legal 
and financial tools necessary for irrigators to develop a large scale irri- 
gation project, just as the irrigation code removed the legal impedi- 
ments created by the riparian doctrine to such projects. The irrigation 
district act allows a majority of landowners or leaseholders (now re- 
ferred to as electors)43 to propose to organize an irrigation district by 
petition.44 If a majority of voting electors vote to organize an irriga- 
tion district, the district is established.45 The district, governed by an 
elected board of directors,46 may establish water charges or land as- 
sessments (i.e. property taxes) to pay for district organization, opera- 
tion and maintenance.47 Districts are authorized to construct 
irrigation canals and reservoirs.48 Construction bonds to pay for the 
appropriators attempting to project current and future stream conditions. There 
is a significant time lag between when appropriations have been obtained for an 
irrigation project and when the project is actually constructed and water di- 
verted. Moreover, obtaining appropriations for a project is no guarantee that the 
project will ultimately be completed. For reclamation projects, federal funding 
must be obtained. Given the current vagaries of federal water project funding, 
federal funding cannot be guaranteed. See B. ANDREWS & M. SANSONE, WHO 
RUNS THE RIVERS? DAhlS AND DECISIONS IN THE NEW WEST, 167-71 (1983). This is 
important to the prospective appropriator as well as appropriators who obtain 
their rights in the interim between water project appropriation approval and pro- 
ject implementation. If the project is constructed and put into operation, the pro- 
ject's priority date relates back to the date the appropriation pennits were 
originally filed, so long as the appropriator "diligently" pursues the construction 
of the irrigation project. NEB. REV. STAT. $ 46-205 (1984). See R. HARNSBERGER & 
N. THORSON, s u p u  note 7, at 8486. Appropriation officials have construed the 
due diligence requirement liberally, bending over backwards to give project spon- 
sors every opportunity to obtain the required federal funding to prosecute the 
project. Thus the prospective appropriator who relies on the water allocated to a 
pending water project becomes a speculator gambling on completion of the 
project. 
40. For a brief discussion of data problems with planning water projects, including 
constructing reservoirs that never fill because of inadequate streamflow, see NA- 
TIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE 528 (1973). 
41. The federal government also recognized the doctrine of prior appropriation in the 
1877 Desert Land Act, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (codified at  43 U.S.C 4 321). See R. 
HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, Supra note 7, at  125-32. 
42. 1895 Act, 8 1 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. 5 46-101 (1984). 
43. An elector must own a t  least 15 acres or lease at least 40 acres within the pro- 
posed irrigation district. NEB. REV. STAT. $46-102 (1984). 
44. Act of March 26,1895, ch. 70, $ 2,1895 Neb. Laws. 270 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. 
3 46-103 (1984)). 
45. I d  (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. $$46-110 to -111 (1984)). 
46. I d  $3 3, 9 (codified at  NEB. REV. STAT. $3 46-112 to -120 (1984)). 
47. Id. $24 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. 8 46-152 (1984)). 
48. I d  22 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. $ 46-145 (1984)). Irrigation districts thus were 
limited to supplying water solely for irrigation. Public power and irrigation dis- 
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costs of developing an irrigation project may be issued if approved in a 
special election.49 
The irrigation district statutes provide powerful organizational and 
financial tools to those wishing to develop irrigation projects. If the 
election to organize a district is successful, the cost of organizing the 
district is borne, not by the original promoters, but by the district. 
Further, bonds may be issued, secured by the real estate within the 
district, to finance irrigation project construction costs. While these 
authorities facilitate irrigation project development, Nebraska has not 
provided direct financial assistance to promote irrigation projects.50 
However, financial assistance would be forthcoming from the federal 
government. 
The 1902 federal reclamation act51 inaugurated the federal water 
development program in the West. Receipts from the sale of public 
lands in the sixteen reclamation states52 were credited to the "recla- 
mation fund," the purpose of which was to construct and maintain "ir- 
tricts, authorized in 1933, are authorized to provide power and to supply water for 
irrigation. Act of April 18,1933, ch. 86,s 3,1933 Neb. Laws 339 (codified at  NEB. 
REV. STAT. 8 70-604(1) (1981)). Reclamation districts, authorized in 1947, are au- 
thorized to supply water for municipal, domestic, irrigation, power, milling, man- 
ufacturing, mining, metallurgical, hunting, fishing, recreational development, 
and other beneficial purposes. Act of June 11,1947, ch. 173,813,1947 Neb. Laws 
535 (codified at  NEB. REV. STAT. $46-541(9), 5 46-541(14) (1984)). The current 
practice for project promoters is to organize as a reclamation district. 
49. Act of March 26, 1895, ch. 70, § 28, 1895 Neb. Laws 289 (codified at NEB. REV. 
STAT. $8 46-144, 46-193 to -1,127 (1984)). 
50. California did establish a state water development program including state con- 
struction and operation of irrigation projects. R. DUNBAR, FORGING NEXJ RIGHTS 
IN WESTERN WATERS 36-45 (1983). The federal government, through the Carey 
Act of 1894, attempted to encourage Desert Land Act states to initiate state recla- 
mation efforts. Carey Act, ch. 301, 3 4, 28 Stat. 422 (current version at  43 U.S.C. 
4 641 (1982)). The act authorized states to apply for federal land grants of up to 
one million acres of unclaimed desert land within their boundaries. States were 
then to oversee the occupation, reclamation and irrigation of such land by home- 
steaders. Twenty acres out of each 160 acre tract was to be put in cultivation 
within 10 years. B. ANDREXIS & M. SANSONE, supra note 39, at 170. Professor Sax 
concludes, "The Carey Act, as expected, resulted in very little reclamation. It 
was a demonstration of what was, by then, reasonably obvious-that large-scale 
reclamation works were not a profitable enterprise." Sax, Federal Reclamation 
Law, 2 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS 120 (R. Clark ed. 1967). That is, reclamation 
projects could not profitably be undertaken by states or private entities. 
51. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (current version at 43 U.S.C. 
45 372-498,1457) (1982)) [hereinafter Reclamation Act]. For a brief discussion of 
the historical background of the Reclamation Act see Sax, supra note 50, at 113- 
21. 
52. The 16 reclamation states designated in the 1902 Reclamation Act are Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyo- 
ming. Reclamation Act, 8 1 (current version at  43 U.S.C. 9 391 (1982)). Texas was 
added in 1906. Act of June 12,1906, ch. 3288,34 Stat. 259 (current version a t  43 
U.S.C. 5 391 (1982)). 
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rigation works for the storage, diversion, and development of waters 
for the reclamation of arid and semiarid lands . . . ."53 The Secretary 
of the Interior was authorized to construct those projects deemed fea- 
sible without Congressional approval.54 Irrigators could water no 
more than 160 acres with reclamation water.55 Irrigators receiving 
reclamation water were required to repay construction costs without 
interest in ten years.56 It was hoped that the reclamation fund would 
be a revolving fund, based on receipts from the public land sales and 
irrigator payment of construction costs, and that the reclamation pro- 
gram would be financially self-contained.57 However, this hope was 
not realized. The reclamation program was never financially self-sup- 
porting, in part because irrigator's repayments were "greatly in 
arrears."58 
The 1902 Reclamation Act was significant in that it established fi- 
nancing (including federal subsidies) for western irrigation projects,59 
creating the expectation that if irrigators wanted cheap irrigation 
water the Bureau of Reclamation would try to accommodate them. 
Without federal financial assistance it is unlikely that many western 
irrigation projects would have been constructed. The initial justifica- 
tion for the federal reclamation program was that it encouraged settle- 
ment and agricultural development of an underdeveloped region. In 
the 1930s' the reclamation program would receive greater federal 
- - - - -- - - -- 
53. Reclamation Act (current version at  43 U.S.C. $ 391 (1982)). 
54. Id at 3 4. Apparently project feasibility related to whether the payments from 
irrigators would meet the project's estimated costs. Id In 1910, Congress re- 
stricted the Secretary's discretion to undertake reclamation projects by requiring 
Presidential approval for reclamation projects. Act of June 25,1910, ch. 407, 3 4, 
36 Stat. 836 (current version at  43 U.S.C. $ 413 (1982)). For a discussion of current 
project initiation and authorization procedures, see Sax, supra note 50, at 136-47. 
55. Reclamation Act of $32 (repealed 1966). This antimonopoly provision is the con- 
troversial excess land reclamation limitation. Sax, supra note 50, at 209-41. The 
limitation was enlarged in 1982 to 960 acres. Reclamation Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 
97-293, $204,96 Stat. 1265, (codified at 43 U.S.C. $390dd (1982)). See B. ANDREWS 
& M. SNSONE, supra note 39, at 177. 
56. Reclamation Act, $ 1 (current version at  43 U.S.C. $391 (1982)). 
57. Sax, supra note 50, at  122. 
58. Id at 129-32. Congress advanced general revenues to the reclamation fund as 
early as 1910. Act of June 25,1910, ch. 407, $1,36 Stat. 835, (codified as amended 
at 43 U.S.C. $397 (1982)). In the early 1970s the annual income from the reclama- 
tion fund comprised approximately one third to one half of annual reclamation 
expenditures. Sax, supra note 50, at  131. 
59. With the enactment of the 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act, Congress broadened 
the scope of the Bureau of Reclamation's program to include multipurpose or 
multi-objective projects, including flood control, hydropower generation, and rec- 
reation, as well as irrigation. Ch. 42,45 Stat. 1057 (1928) (current version codified 
at  43 U.S.C. $$ 617-617u (1982)). See B. ANDREwS & M. SAMSONE, supra note 39, 
at 180. While current Bureau projects are termed multipurpose projects, there is 
some justification for considering them irrigation projects, as the other purposes 
are ancillary to irrigation. 
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funding as part of the public works policy the New Deal used to re- 
lieve unemployment. However, after World War I1 agricultural sur- 
pluses became a continuing problem, and federal subsidy of irrigation 
projects was to come under increasing scrutiny. Ultimately federal 
budget concerns would place federal funding for water projects into a 
political limbo from which it has not yet completely emerged. 
13. Drought, Depression, and Ground Water Development: 1930-1967 
The drought and depression of the 1930s led to a significant in- 
crease in the reclamation program,60 as New Dealers sought to reduce 
unemployment through ambitious public works programs. The New 
Deal also helped develop irrigation projects through non-reclamation 
programs, such as the Public Works Administration and the Works 
Progress Administration.61 The Tri-County project, Nebraska's larg- 
est surface water project, was financed through the PWA.62 
The Tri-County project led to numerous court challenges, one of 
which significantly influenced the direction of Nebraska water devel- 
opment and policy. In the famous Ostemzun decision, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court ruled that the movement of water from one river ba- 
sin to another violated Nebraska appropriation law.63 The suit was 
filed by Tri-County project opponents, fearful of the downstream ef- 
fects of the large project. The legal issue turned on the interpretation 
of two conflicting statutes. Section 46-206, enacted in 1893,64 stated 
that water could not be diverted for use in another river basin unless 
the stream was over 100 feet wide, in which case no more than 75% 
could be diverted into another basin. Section 46-265, enacted in 1895,65 
stated that unused irrigation water must be returned to the stream 
from which it was originally diverted, or to the Missouri river. This 
latter statute was seized upon by the O s t m n  court to invalidate Tri- 
60. During the 1930s, annual Bureau of Redamation expenditures were sometimes 
10 times the annual income of the redamation fund. Sax, supra note 50, at 131. 
61. HOLMES I, supra note 1, at 13,15-16. 
62. C. WAMAKEFL, IRRIGATION PIONEERS: A HISTORY OF THE TRI-COUNTY PROJECT 
TO 1935, a t  20409 (1964). The Tri-County Project, operated by the Central Ne- 
braska Public Power and Irrigation District, includes Lake McConaughy, the 
largest lake in Nebraska. For a discussion of the Tri-County system see Harns- 
berger, Oeltjen & Fischer, Groundwater: From Windmills to Compre-ve 
Public Management, 52 NEB. L. REV. 179,28492 (1973) [hereinafter Windmills]. 
63. Osterman v. Central Neb. Pub. Power and Irrigation Dist., 131 Neb. 356,268 N.W. 
334 (1936), overruled, Little Blue Natural Resources Dist. v. Lower Platte North 
Natural Resources Dist., 206 Neb. 535, 294 N.W.2d 598 (1980). Regarding Oster- 
man, see also Oeltjen, Harnsberger & Fischer, Interbesin Transfers: Nebraska 
Law and Legend, 51 NEB. L. RW. 87, 10407 (1971) bereinafter Interbasin 
Tramfm] .  
64. 1893 Act 5 3 (codified as amended a t  NEB. REV. STAT. 5 46-206 (1984)). 
65. 1895 Act 5 59 (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. 5 46-265 (1984)). 
20 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW pol .  66:s 
County's plan to use Platte River water to irrigate lands in the Platte, 
Blue and Republican River basins. 
The effect of Osterman was to reserve Platte River water to Platte 
valley interests, at least temporarily. Irrigators from the Blue and Re- 
publican River basins, the areas of the original Tri-County project 
which were excised in Osterman, could not expect to obtain Platte 
River water to supplement local water supplies. The decision proba- 
bly kept Nebraska from obtaining federal reclamation funding it 
otherwise might have obtained to use Platte River water in the Blue 
and Republican basins. Conversely, the O s t m a n  decision protected 
"instream" water uses-such as ground water recharge, subirrigation, 
and wildlife maintenance-as well as inbasin water development po- 
tential, which otherwise may have been lost to out-of-basin 
developments. 
The devastating drought of the 1930s also led to the first surge of 
ground water development in Nebraska. In 1935 alone over 1000 irri- 
gation wells were drilled.66 In later decades ground water depletion 
would give rise to demand for more irrigation projects as ground water 
overtook surface water as the primary source of irrigation water in 
Nebraska. The first significant ground water law development was 
the 1933 Nebraska Supreme Court decision in Olson v. City of Wa- 
h00.67 In this well interference case, the court ruled that ground 
water was not the private property of the landowner, that landowners 
could use ground water on their land without waste, and that ground 
water would be shared by competing users during periods of shortage. 
The sharing principle was later embodied in the 1975 Ground Water 
Management Act. 
The major federal development of the 1940s was enactment of the 
1944 Flood Control Act.68 The act adopted the Pick-Sloan plan to de- 
velop the Missouri river basin for flood control, power generation, and 
irrigation.69 The Pick-Sloan plan is significant to Nebraska water de- 
velopment in that it created a special basin account for future water 
projects in the Missouri River basin. Power revenues from hydroelec- 
tric power plants associated with main-stem Missouri River reservoirs 
would be used to subsidize irrigation projects in the Missouri River 
basin.70 
There were few notable state surface water law changes in the 
- - - -- -- - - 
66. Aiken, Nekaska Cround Water Law and Policy, 59 NEB. L. REV. 917, 944 (1980). 
67. 124 Neb. 802, 248 N.W. 304 (1933). See Windmills, supra. note 63, at 192-96. 
68. Flood Control Act, ch. 665,58 Stat. 887 (1944) (codified at 33 U.S.C. 5 701-1 et. seq. 
(1986)). 
69. J. AUCOIN, WATER IN NEBRASKA 50-55 (1984). The book is a readable account of 
Nebraska water history, policies and issues. 
70. Id. at 57-59; Sax, supra note 50, at 135-36. 
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1950s and 1960s.71 However, significant changes occurred in Nebraska 
ground water legislation. In the 1950s drought, combined with the de- 
velopment of sprinkler irrigation systems, led to greater ground water 
irrigation-in 1959 the number of acres irrigated from ground water 
surpassed the number irrigated with surface water.72 With this in- 
crease in ground water development came the first realization that de- 
velopment could lead to depletion. This realization, plus increasing 
ground water irrigation (strengthened by the boom in center pivot de- 
velopment of the middle 1960s)73 led to a steady stream of legislation, 
beginning with the irrigation well registration,74 ground water prefer- 
ences,75 and well spacing statutes76 of 1957, Concerns regarding 
ground water depletion led to enacting ground water conservation dis- 
trict (GWCD) statutes in 1959.77 Subsequent ground water legislation 
71. However, in 1965 Congress enacted the federal Water Resources Planning Act, 
Pub. L. No. 89-90,79 Stat. 244 (codified at  42 U.S.C. 8 1962 et seq. (1982)). A major 
feature of the act was funding for state water planning programs to facilitate sur- 
face water development; federal funds would be provided to the state to prepare 
general water development plans for river basins or the state. Federa1 agencies 
would then follow these state water plans in planning and designing particular 
federal surface water projects. The purpose of these state water plans was to 
reduce state-federal conflicts in federal water project development. The Reagan 
administration ended state water planning program funding. Energy and Water 
Development Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-88, 95 Stat. 1135 (1981). 
In 1967 the Unicameral directed the Nebraska Soil and Water Conservation 
Commission to utilize these federal water planning funds to prepare what is now 
known as the Framework Study, a statewide assessment of water resources needs 
and a guide to future development. The final Framework Study report was pre- 
pared in 1971, which identified potential surface water development opportuni- 
ties in Nebraska. NEB. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION COMM'N, REPORT ON THE 
FRAMETYoRK STUDY 121-30 (1971) [hereinafter FRA~FEWORK STUDY]. 
72. Aiken, supra note 66, at  948. 
73. Id at 951; AUCOIN, supra note 69, at  38-41. 
74. Irrigation Well Registration Act, ch. 200,1957 Neb. Laws. 701,701-04 (1957) (codi- 
fied at  NEB. REV. STAT. $§ 46-601 to -607 (1984)). See Aiken, supra note 66, at 949- 
50; R NARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, a t  230-31. 
75. Groundwater Preference Act, ch. 199, 1957 Neb. Laws. 701 (1957) (codified at  
NEB. REV. STAT, § 46-613 (1984)). See Aiken, supra note 66, at 951; R. HARNs- 
BERGER & N. THORSON, Supra note 7, at  236-40. 
76. Spacing of Irrigation Wells Act, ch. 201, 1957 Neb. Laws. 704 (1957) (codified as 
amended at NEB. REV. STAT. @46-608 to -612 (1984)). See Aiken, supra note 66, 
at  950; R. H~~RNSBERGER & THORSON, supra note 7, at 231-33. 
77. Groundwater Conservation Act, ch. 220,1959 Neb. Laws. 773-781 (1959) (codified 
as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. $5 46-614 to -634 (1984)). See Aiken, supra note 
67, at  950-51. The GWCDs were instrumental in developing public awareness 
about improved irrigation practices, including irrigation scheduling, which helped 
make a greater degree of ground water regulation politically more acceptable. 
See id at 951 n.163. The 46-664 irrigation runoff requirement of the Ground 
Water Management Act probably stems from the runoff controls established and 
enforced by the Blue River Association of GWCDs. GWCDs were subsequently 
replaced by ground water controI areas administered by Natural Resources Dis- 
tricts. See id a t  960-67. 
22 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW po l .  66:8 
included well abandonment requirements to protect ground water 
quality78 and authorization of municipal ground water transfers.79 
In 1969 Nebraska adopted an important institutional innovation. 
Twenty-four Natural Resources Districts, organized along river basin 
boundaries, were established, replacing over a hundred single purpose 
districts, primarily soil and water conservation districts.80 NRDs have 
developed into effective and professional water development advo- 
cates,sl and are in part responsible for the local control orientation of 
Nebraska ground water depletion policies. 
111. THE ENVIRONMENTAL REVOLUTION AND Tm "NXW 
FEDERALISM": 1968-1986 
During its first 60 years the federal reclamation program was gen- 
erally supported by other federal policies, most notably the federal 
public works policies of the 1930s and post-World War I1 period.82 
However, federal environmental and budgetary policy changes in the 
1970s and 1980s would significantly conflict with the traditional recla- 
mation program objectives. New state and federal environmental laws 
78. Enactment of well abandonment statutes reflected the first realization that 
ground water development could affect ground water quality. See Well Registra- 
tion Act and Abandonment, ch. 230,1961 Neb. Laws 683,683-84 (1961) (codified as 
amended at NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-602 (1984)). See Aiken, supra note 66 at 951; R. 
HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at 234-35. 
79. The need for municipalities in and near the Platte River valley to import ground 
water led to authorization of municipal ground water transfers in 1963. Munici- 
pal Groundwater Transfers Act, ch. 276, 828,828-32 (1963) 1963 Neb. Laws (codi- 
fied as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. 46-638 to -650 (1984)). See R. 
HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at 241-44. Municipal representatives 
pointed to the interrelationship between ground water withdrawals from the 
Platte River alluvium and streamflow and the need to legally integrate surface 
and ground water uses. However, ground water irrigators' fears that that their 
uses would be subordinated to surface water appropriations under the priority 
(first in time is first in right) doctrine prevented integrating ground and surface 
water rights. Aiken, supra note 66, at 953-55. 
80. Conservation of Natural Resources Act, L.B. 1357, 1969 Neb. Laws 99, 99-145 
(1969) (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. $2-3201 to -3289 (1984)). See 
Windmills, supra note 62, at 25464. 
81. One problem irrigation project promoters face is finding an effective local advo- 
cate to promote the project at local, state, and federal levels. Generally irrigation 
districts, public power districts, and reclamation districts could not afford to hire 
a full-time advocate. With the creation of NRDs, water project promoters could 
look to the permanent, full-time NRD staff to provide technical and advocacy 
assistance. NRD managers fulfill this function for a wide range of resource devel- 
opment projects, of which irrigation projects are the largest. 
82. Economists feared that the U.S. economy would suffer a recession or depression 
as federal war spending stopped at the end of the war. Thus federal public works 
projects were seen as a mechanism for helping prevent this postwar bust. In fact, 
postwar spending to rebuild Europe under the Marshall Plan helped maintain the 
economic demand for American products and the postwar bust did not 
materialize. 
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required that the environmental consequences of proposed water 
projects be evaluated, and that, in appropriate circumstances, projects 
could not be constructed if they interfered with endangered wildlife 
species or other environmental values. These environmental statutes 
provided project opponents new means to challenge and delay water 
projects. A federal study commission challenged many of the tradi- 
tional justifications for reclamation projects, legitimizing political crit- 
icism of previously sacrosanct water projects. 
Perhaps most significantly, Presidents Carter and Reagan, on cost 
and environmental grounds, have not proposed initiating any new rec- 
lamation projects. New federal water project funding legislation re- 
quires states to pay 35% of costs for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
irrigation projects. While the shape of evolving federal policies regard- 
ing financing reclamation projects are not yet clear, evidence suggests 
that new reclamation projects will also require significant state and/or 
local funding to qualify for federal cost-sharing assistance. This is in 
dramatic contrast to prior federal policies, where the federal govern- 
ment paid up to 90% of project costs. Federal and related state policies 
were no longer directly supporting of the traditional reclamation pro- 
gram mission, but instead were challenging that mission and the as- 
sumptions upon which it was based. These policy changes required 
new state policies regarding water projects in Nebraska. 
A. Wild and Scenic Rivers Act 
The first indication that federal policy towards reclamation was 
changing was the enactment of federal environmental legislation to 
protect environmental values often disrupted by water development 
projects. The first act was the Wild and Scenic River Act of 1968.83 
The intent of the act is to complement federal water impoundment 
activities with one of preserving free-flowing rivers in their natural 
state.84 The Act establishes a national system of protected riparian 
environments by initially designating certain river reaches as compo- 
nents of the system and by providing a mechanism by which other 
river reaches may be added to the system.85 Additional rivers can be 
brought into the system (I) by an act of Congress or (2) upon applica- 
tion of the governor(s) of the concerned state(s) after approval by the 
Secretary of the Interior and designation in a state prograrn.86 
83. Pub, L. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. $8 1271-87 (1982)). 
See Tarlock & Tippy, 17re WiM and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 55 CORNELL . 
REV. 707 (1970); B. ANDREFVS & M. SANSONE, supa note 39, at 121-24; Comment, 
Federal Protection of Instream Values, 57 NEB. L. REV. 368, 393-94 (1978). 
84. 16 U.S.C. 4 1271 (1982). 
85. Id at $ 1272. Fifty-five river segments currently included in the wild and scenic 
river system are listed at 16 U.S.C. $ 1274(a) (1982, Supp. I11 1985). 
86. Id at 5 1273(a) (1982). Ninety-one river segments identified for potential inclu- 
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River segments are classified as a "wild river area," a "scenic river 
area," or a "recreational river area," depending on the river area's 
character.87 The Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agri- 
culture are authorized to acquire up to 100 acres of land per mile on 
both sides of rivers included in the system,*8 giving the federal govern- 
ment some control over future development of the river corridor. 
More significantly, federal agencies are prohibited from authorizing, 
assisting, or developing water impoundment projects within system 
river components or in rivers which may be potentially included in the 
system.89 Finally, system components are required to be managed by 
federal agencies to preserve and enhance the values which led to in- 
clusion in the wild and scenic rivers system.90 
The Act's prohibition of impoundment in stream segments in- 
cluded in the wild and scenic river system poses a significant threat to 
water development. The Act allows project opponents to attempt to 
have the river segment to be developed for impoundment included in 
the wild and scenic river system or at least studied for possible inclu- 
sion. Aware of this, whenever Nebraska stream segments have been 
suggested by the state for study for inclusion in the system, the seg- 
ments nominated have carefully excluded segments where potential 
impoundment sites are located.91 Beyond this, the Act was the first 
sion in the system are listed at  16 U.S.C. 9 1276(a) (1982,,Supp. I11 1985). Several 
states, excluding Nebraska, have adopted state wild and scenic river programs. 
For a discussion of conflicts between state and federal scenic river programs, see 
Fairfax, Andrews, & Buchsbaum, Federalism and the Wild and Scenic Rivers 
Act: Now You See It, Now You Don't, 59 WASH, L. REV. 417 (1984). Nebraska 
Senator Exon has introduced legislation that would include portions of the Nio- 
brara River in the wild and scenic river system. S. 1713,99th Cong., 2d Sess., 131 
CONG. REC. 124, 12317 (1985). See generally NEB. NATURAL RESOURCES Cohnt '~ ,  
THE NIOBRARA RIVER: A PROPOSAL FOR SCENIC RIVER DESIGNATION (1986) (ex- 
amines Exon's proposal to protect Niobrara as a scenic river). 
87. 16 U.S.C. $1273(b) (1982). 
88. Id at 8 1277(a). Private land may be condemned. Id at $1277(b). 
89. Id at $1278. This would include projects for which federal authorization was 
required, such as under the federal 404 permit program, 33 U.S.C. 9 1344 (1982, 
Supp. I11 1985), as well as federally financed reclamation projects. Regarding the 
404 program, see infra text accompanying notes 103-14. 
90. 16 U.S.C. 8 1281(a) (1982). The federal government may enter into a cooperative 
agreement with a state or political subdivision to participate in administering the 
river area. Id. at 8 1281(e). 
91. In the 1971 Framework Study, the Nebraska Soil and Water Conservation Com- 
mission, now the Nebraska Natural Resources Commission, recommended the 
Niobrara River, site of the controversial Norden Project, for potential designation 
as a protected river "from its confluence with Antelope Creek downstream to the 
headwaters of the proposed Norden Reservoir." FRAMEWORK STUDY, supra note 
71, at 261. Similarly, the federal Platte Level B Study recommended for potential 
designation as a protected river "the Calarnus river above the recommended Cala- 
mus Reservoir." MISSOURI RIVER BASIN CORIM'N, REPORT ON THE PLAITE RIVER 
BASIN, NEBRASKA LEVEL B STUDY 177 (1976) bereinafter PLATTE LEVEL B 
STUDY]. Nebraska has not adopted a state wild and scenic river or protected river 
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forthright acknowledgement by Congress that water development and 
environmental protection could clash, and that in some cases environ- 
mental values should be protected even if water development was 
thereby constrained.92 
B. National Environmental Policy Act 
The second federal statute enacted that has significantly impeded 
the reclamation program is the National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969 (NEPA).93 NEPA is the best known of the federal environmen- 
tal statutes and has spawned the most litigation. NEPA requires fed- 
eral agencies whose actions have significant environmental 
consequences to publicly identify those consequences in a detailed en- 
vironmental impact statement (EIS), to evaluate those consequences, 
and to consider alternative courses of action with less environmental 
disruption before taking final action.94 The EIS requirement is the 
heart of NEPA, and has been used to require federal water develop- 
ment agencies, however reluctantly,gs to more fully explore the envi- 
ronmental consequences of the proposed water project and less 
environmentally disruptive alternatives to that project. If an agency 
fails to prepare an adequate environmental impact statement, the ade- 
quacy of the statement can be challenged in court and the agency re- 
system, even though both water planning studies recommended such a system. 
FRAMEWORK STUDY, supra note 71, a t  261 (Recommendation 9); PLA?TE LEVEL B 
STUDY, supra, at  176. 
92. The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act was not the first federal statute dealing with the 
environmental consequences of water development. The Fish and Wildlife Coor- 
dination Act of 1934,16 U.S.C. @661-666(c) (1982), provides "that wildlife conser- 
vation shall receive equal consideration and be coordinated with other features of 
water-resource development programs through the effectual and harmonious 
planning, development, maintenance, and coordination of wildlife conservation 
and rehabilitation." Id at 3 661. The act requires federal officials to confer with 
state wildlife officials "with a view to the conservation of wildlife resources by 
preventing loss of and damage to such resources" when a federal program or per- 
mit is required for water diversion, impoundment, or channel modification. Id at 
4 662(a). See Guilbert, Wildlife Presmation Under Federal Law, in FEDERAL 
ENVIRON~IENTAL L A W  550, 553-57 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974) Comment, 
supra note 83, at  38486. 
93. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70a (1982)). See g m Z l y  B. ANDREIVS & M. SANSONE, supra 
note 39, at  115-17; Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, in FED- 
ERAL ENVIRON~IENTAL AW, supra note 92, a t  238-419; ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE 
COURTS (1973); MacBeth, The National Environmental Policy Act After Five 
Years, 2 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1975); Comment, supra note 83, at  381-82. 
94, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). Many states have enacted "little NEPAs" or 
"SEPAs." Pridgeon, Anderson & Delphey, State Environmental Policy Acts: A 
Survey of Recent DmeZopmats, 2 HARV. ENVTL . REV. 419 (1977). Nebraska has 
not. Cf: NEB. REV. STAT. $5 81-1501 to -1532 (1986 Cum. Supp.). 
95. See Cramton & Berg, On Leading a Horse to Water: NEPA and the Federal Bu- 
Teaurnmy, 71 MICH. L. REV. 511 (1972). 
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quired to prepare additional studies. NEPA does not require the 
federal decision-maker to select the most environmentally sound al- 
ternative, but rather to make a reasoned selection, considering the en- 
vironmental consequences.96 
NEPA was used to contest construction of the proposed Norden 
Dam on the Niobrara River in Save the Niobra~a Ass'n v. Andrus.97 
The Norden Dam litigation involved the Bureau of Reclamation 
O'Neill Unit, which proposed to irrigate approximately 77,000 acres in 
north central Nebraska from the water impounded by the Norden 
Dam on the Niobrara River28 The court ruled that the EIS prepared 
by the Bureau failed to satisfactorily address the geologic stability of 
the dam site, the ground water quality effects of the irrigation project, 
the effect on wildlife, and project alternatives.99 The court enjoined 
the project pending revision of the EIS.100 That ruling began a project 
delay that has resulted in an evaluation of irrigation water supply al- 
ternatives to the original impoundment proposal.lo1 
Save the N ~ O ~ U T U  illustrates how N E P A  provides water project 
opponents with a better means to oppose projects on environmental 
grounds than they traditionally have been afforded by state law.102 
Save the Niohara also is significant in that Norden is the first (and 
only) Nebraska water project that has been significantly affected by 
federal environmental law. 
96. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978); Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. 
Karlen, 444 U.S. 223,227 (1980). In spite of the Supreme Court rulings that NEPA 
is procedural rather than substantive, some federal agencies have nonetheless at- 
tempted to minimize or obscure the adverse environmental impacts of their pro- 
posed action, probably on the basis that opponents would use the EIS 
identification of adverse environmental impacts to politically oppose the project. 
This, of course, leaves the agency open to having the EIS deemed inadequate 
when it is challenged in court. 
97. 10 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1665 (D. Neb. 1977). 
98. Id a t  1666-67. 
99. Id at 1670-72, 1678-80. 
100. Id at 1681. 
101. NEBRASKA DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, NEBRASKA STATE-LED O'NEILL UNIT 
ALTERNATIVES STUDY (1985). The Niobrara river is now the subject of a proposed 
federal scenic river designation. See w p r u  note 86 and i d r u  note 292. 
102. The only opportunity available to Norden project opponents would have been 
when the project's water rights were granted by the Nebraska Department of 
Water Resources. At that time the only ground upon which the permit could 
have been denied would have been if the proposed use of water was not benefi- 
cial, or if the project was not in the public interest. See NEB. REV. STAT. $3 46-204, 
-229, -231, -234 (1984). Neither concept has been judicially defined in Nebraska. 
See R. HARNSBERGER & N . THORSON, supra note 7 ,  at 78-79. However, now the 
Water Management Board may review major water projects to determine 
whether they should be modified to, among other things, accommodate environ- 
mental objectives and/or competing water projects. See infra text accompanying 
notes 285-97. 
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C. Section 404 Dredge and Fill Permits 
Section 404 of the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments (Clean Water Act)los goes beyond the identification of 
environmental impacts of proposed federal projects required under 
NEPA. Section 404 requires public and private construction activities 
in water bodies to meet water quality and environmental protection 
criteria. The section 404 program is the first federal environmental 
statute superimposing substantive constraints on federal water re- 
sources projects. 
Section 404 is only a part of the federal water pollution control pro- 
gram. The 1972 Clean Water Act established a comprehensive na- 
tional program of regulating~discharges of pollutants into water from 
point sources through NPDES permit requirements.104 States were 
encouraged to assume administration of the federal NPDES water 
quality program through federal program administration grants avail- 
able to states with federally approved water pollution control 
programs.lo5 
The section 404 program was designed to avoid overlap between 
EPA's NPDES program and the Corps's permitting authority under 
the Rivers and Harbors Act.106 There is some irony in this fact, as the 
Corps is better known as a water developer than as an environmental 
regulator.107 The purpose of the section 404 program is to prevent en- 
vironmental disruption resulting from the hydrologic modification of 
water bodies, including streams (e.g. from stream channelization or 
103. 33 U.S.C. 3 1344 (1982). See R HARNSBERGER & N. RIORSON, supra note 7, at  
20408; Blumm, The &an Water Act's Section 404 Pennit Program E n t m  Its 
Adolescence: An Institutional and Programmatic Perspective, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
409 (1980); Thompson, Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
A d m b  of 1977: Hydrologic Modification, Wetlands Protection and the 
Physical Integ~Sy of the Nation's Waters, 2 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 264 (1977). 
104. 33 U.S.C. $1311 et. seq. (1982). NPDES stands for the National Pollution Dis- 
charge Elimination System. Id at 5 1342. See R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, 
supra note 7, at 321-24. 
105. 33 U.S.C. 3 1256 (1982). See ako id 5 1342. The Nebraska Department of Envi- 
ronmental Control administers the NPDES program in Nebraska. NEB. A ~ h m .  
R U B  & REGS. 119 (1980). 
106. Section 9 of the Rivers and Harbors Act requires Congressional and Corps ap- 
proval for the construction of any bridge, dam, dike, or causeway over or in any 
navigable waters of the United States. 33 U.S.C. 4 401 (1982). Section 10 of the 
Rivers and Harbors Act requires a Corps permit for any obstruction placed in 
navigable waters not specifically authorized by Congress. Id 3 403. The tradi- 
tional purpose of the Corps' $8 9 and 10 pennits is to prevent interference with 
navigation. However, that purpose had been broadened to include environmental 
considerations even prior to the Clean Water Act. See Kramon, Section Ten of the 
Rivers and Harbors Act: The Emergence of a New Protection for Tidal Mamhes, 
33 MD. L. REV. 229 (1973); Thompson, supra note 103, a t  267-71. 
107. See generally B. ANDREWS & M. SANSONE, supa  note 39, at 13466 (overview of 
the Corps' water development activities). 
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impoundment).los The scope of the section 404 program is very broad, 
affecting virtually any construction in all waters of the United States, 
rather than the traditional definition of navigable waters.109 As a re- 
sult, section 404 permits are required for virtually any water project, 
as they involve the placing of dredged or fill material into waters of 
the United States.110 
Section 404 was amended in 1977 to exempt certain federal projects 
from the permit requirement.111 The exemption applies if (1) the pro- 
ject is authorized by Congress, (2) the effects of the proposed dis- 
charge are considered in an EIS, (3) the EIS is submitted to Congress 
prior to the discharge, and (4) Congress, after receiving the EIS, subse- 
quently either authorizes the project or appropriates funds for the 
project.112 Legislative history indicates that Congress intended the 
section 404(r) exemption to apply to projects "which are entirely 
planned, financed, and constructed by a Federal agency in every re- 
spect."ll3 Thus Bureau of Reclamation projects would not be ex- 
108. See Thompson, supra note 103, at  26467. 
109. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Calloway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 
1975) (Corps definition of "waters of the United States as traditionally navigable 
waters invalidated as too narrow). See R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra 
note 7, at 205; Thompson, supra note 103, at 273-75. 
110. Technically a $404 permit is not required to merely dredge or excavate material 
from a water body so long as none is discharged back into the water body; a per- 
mit is required only to place dredged or fill material therein. However, as 
Thompson notes, "it is almost impossible to remove sediment or other material 
from a stream without discharging part of it back into the water." Thompson, 
supra note 103, at 272. 
The Corps uses the $ 404(b)(l) environmental guidelines adopted by the EPA 
in determining whether a $ 404 permit should be granted. 33 U.S.C. $ 1344(b)(l) 
(1982). Technically the 3 404 permit authorizes the discharge of dredged or fill 
materials into a specified "disposal site" within waters of the United States. The 
EPA Administrator is authorized, through the $404(b)(l) environmental guide- 
lines, to prohibit or restrict the discharge of dredged or fill materials into water 
bodies if the discharge would have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal 
water supplies, shellfish beds, fishery areas, wildlife, or recreational areas. Id at 
3 1344(c). The objective of the guidelines is to maintain the ecological integrity of 
the aquatic environment. 40 C.F.R. 3 230.la (1985). 
111. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1605 (codified at 33 U.S.C. 
$ 1344(r) (1982)). See Thompson, supra note 103, at 271-86. The 1977 amend- 
ments also authorized "general permits" to administratively exempt categories of 
dredge and fill activities from pennit requirements, to exempt certain agricul- 
tural practices from permit requirements, and to authorize state administration 
of the $ 404 program. 33 U.S.C. $ 1344(e), (f), (g)-(k) (1982). 
112. 33 U.S.C. 3 1344(r) (1982). The 5 404(r) exemption process was no doubt a reac- 
tion to the TVA v. Hi11 endangered species case, in which the TVA unsuccessfully 
argued that its identification of endangered species destruction in its EIS and the 
subsequent appropriation by Congress of construction funds constituted a Con- 
gressional ratification of the project and acquiescence to the effects on endan- 
gered species. See infra text accompanying notes 120-38. 
113. 123 CONG. REC. S19,654 (daily ed. Dec. 15,1977) (floor statement of Sen. Stafford). 
See Thompson, supra note 103, at  284-86. 
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empted because state and/or focal financing is required. 
Section 404 was a profound legal development because it began to 
interject environmental values into federal public works policies. Sec- 
tion 404 is the first federal environmental law establishing what has 
been referred to as "regulatory property rights."114 By establishing a 
program to administratively protect aquatic environmental values, the 
section 404 program effectively creates and preserves public property 
rights in those aquatic environments. 
D. Endangered Species Act 
The 1973 Act. The second federal environmental statute establish- 
ing "regulatory property rights" is the Federal Endangered Species 
Act of 1973 (FESA), which affirmatively requires federal agencies to 
refrain from taking action that would harm endangered species or 
their critical habitat.115 While earlier federal endangered species stat- 
utes dealt primarily with the hunting and taking of endangered spe- 
cies,ll6 the 1973 FESA recognized that the destruction of natural 
habitat was a greater threat to endangered species than huntkg.117 
Thus a major focus of the FESA was protection of habitat critical to 
the continued existence of federally designated threatened or endan- 
gered wildlife species. This feature of the FESA established regula- 
tory property rights in critical habitat of endangered and threatened 
species which would conflict with implementing federal water devel- 
opment projects. 
The most important provision of the FESA relative to federal 
water projects is the section 7 interagency cooperation require- 
ments.118 Section 7 imposes on federal agencies a consultation re- 
quirement and an independent requirement to refrain from taking 
actions harming listed species or their critical habitat. The specIes and 
habitat protection requirements take precedence over the federal 
agency's primary mission.ll9 
114. Tarlock, 2'7~ Endangered Species Act and Western Water Rights, 20 LAND & 
WATER L.REV. 1, 3 (1985). 
115. See 16 U.S.C. $8 1531-43 (1982 & Supp. 11983); B. ANDREIVS & M. SANSONE, supra 
note 39, at  118-21; Coggins, Conserving Wildl$e I2esources, An Overview of the 
Endangered Species Act of 1973,51 N.D.L. REV. 315 (1975); Comment, supra note 
83, at  389-92. 
116. B. ANDREVIS & M. SANSONE, supra note 39, a t  118-19; Coggins, F e h a l  Wildlife 
Law Achieves Adolescence: Deveibpntents in the 1970s, 1978 DUKE L.J. 753 (1978). 
117. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 179 (1978). 
118. Pub. L. 93-205 8 7, 87 Stat. 892 (currently codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 
1536(a) (1982)) (emphasis added). 
119. The 1969 Endangered Species Act authorized federal agencies to preserve the 
habitat of endangered species on federal lands under their jurisdiction only inso- 
far as it was practicable and consistent with the agency's primary mission. En- 
dangered Species Act of 1969, Pub. L. 89-669, $ l(b), 80 Stat. 926. The bills 
introduced to amend the 1969 act originally had the same practicability considera- 
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Section 7 (1) requires federal agencies to consult with the Interior 
Department (in fact the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service) to determine 
whether proposed agency action would harm threatened or endan- 
gered species or their critical habitat, and (2) further prohibits federal 
agencies from taking actions harming threatened or endangered spe- 
cies or their habitat. The section 7 consultation requirement provides 
substantial legal protection to endangered or threatened species and to 
their associated habitat. In the 1973 act this legal protection was abso- 
lute: there was no procedure for granting waivers or exemptions, and 
no procedure for evaluating the costs and benefits of the proposed fed- 
eral action relative to endangered species conservation. Thus, if a pro- 
posed water project would violate section 7, the project would have to 
be modified to accommodate threatened or endangered species and/or 
their critical habitat or else not be constructed. However, this endan- 
gered species preservation policy was significantly amended in 1978 in 
the wake of the 1977 U.S. Supreme Court TVA v. Hill opinion. The 
case applied section 7 to stop completion of a major federal water pro- 
ject, the Tellico dam and reservoir, that was nearly completed. 
TVA v. Hill. The major Supreme Court opinion interpreting the 
1973 FESA was TVA v. HiZZ,120 the Tellico dam controversy involving 
the three inch snail darter fish. The issues, as stated by the Court, 
were whether the F'ESA applied retroactively to a project that was 
nearly completed, and whether continued congressianal appropria- 
tions for the Tellico dam constituted an implied repeal of FESA re- 
garding Tellico.121 
Tellico dam was constructed on the Little Tennessee River by the 
TVA to impound water by flooding 16,500 acres for shoreline develop- 
ment, power, flood control, and recreational purposes.Uz Construction 
was originally authorized in 1967, and Congress continued to appropri- 
ate money for the project up to the time of the Supreme Court deci- 
tions and were consistent with primary purpose limitations. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 
153,181 (1978). However, these restrictions were eliminated from the final bill in 
conference. Id at 182. 
Section 9 is the takings provision of the FESA. Section 9 prohibits virtually all 
importing, exporting, taking, possession, selling, delivery, transportation or ship- 
ping of listed species. 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (1982). To take a listed species is defined as 
"to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or 
attempt to engage in any such conduct." Id at 8 1532(19). Thus, each time an 
endangered species were killed by a water project, for example, a taking would 
occur. See Tarlock, supra note 114, at 9. See abo 16 U.S.C. 9 1539(a)(2)(B) (1982), 
discussed iqfra note 185. 
120. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). See Comment, Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978: 
A Congressional Response to Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 5 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL L. 283 (1979). 
121. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 156 (1978). 
122. Id at 157. 
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sion.123 The project had been delayed approximately two years 
through NEPA litigation.124 Shortly before the NEPA injunction was 
dissolved, a new species of perch, the snail darter, was discovered in 
the Little Tennessee River.125 On October 8,1975, the snail darter was 
formally listed as an endangered species.lz6 In the designation, the 
Secretary noted that the snail darter lives only in that portion of the 
Little Tennessee River that would be innundated by Tellico.127 Subse- 
quently, the Secretary designated that portion of the Little Tennessee 
River as critical habitat for the snail darter.us Negotiations between 
the Fish and Wildlife Service and the TVA were of no avail, and litiga- 
tion under the FESA was initiatedP9 
The district court found that closure of the Tellico Dam would ad- 
versely modify, if not completely destroy, the snail darter's critical 
habitat, jeopardizing the continued existence of the species.130 None- 
theless the court refused to enjoin completion of the project, because 
of continuing congressional appropriations, and because of the loss of 
federal expenditures for the dam.131 The court of appeals reversed, 
interpreting section 7 as prohibiting completion of the dam if it jeop- 
ardized endangered species or their habitat.132 The court concluded 
that Tellico could be completed only if Congress legislatively ex- 
empted the project from the FESA, if the snail darter were removed 
from endangered species status, or if the snail darter's critical habitat 
were redefined to exclude the dam site. 
Chief Justice Burger, for a divided Court, began the analysis of the 
issues with a review of the legislative history of the act, and concluded 
that Congress intended to afford endangered species protection the 
highest of governmental priorities.133 The Court noted the 1973 FESA 
went beyond prior federal endangered species legislation by deleting 
language that would require federal agencies to protect endangered 
species only insofar as it were practicable and did not conflict with the 
primary mission of the agency.134 In doing so, Congress indicated its 
123. Id at 158. 
124. See Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn. 1973), 
dfd, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974); Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 339 F. 
Supp. 806 (E.D. Tern. 1972), cEfSd, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972). 
125. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 153, 158-59 (1978). 
126. 40 Fed. Reg. 47005-06 (1976); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1978). 
127. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 161 (1978). 
128. 4l Fed. Reg. 13925-28 (1976); W A  v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,162 (1978). 
129. W A  V. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 162-65 (1978). 
130. EUU v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. 753,756-57 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 
153,165-66 (1978). 
131. FiilI v. W A ,  419 F. Supp. at 753, 758-60. See TVA v. W, 437 U.S. 153, 166-67 
(1978). 
132. Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977). See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,168 (1978). 
133. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978). 
134. Id at 180-82. 
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belief that the value of the genetic material of even a single species is 
virtually incalculable, and that endangered species protection should 
override an agency's primary mission.l35 Against this legislative back- 
ground, the Court found that Congress intended the F'ESA to be retro- 
active and that it be enforced even if ongoing projects were thereby 
stopped.136 The Court also determined that continued appropriations 
for Tellico did not exempt it from FESA's provisions,l37 and that com- 
pletion of the dam therefor should be enjoined.138 
Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Administration. A second 
FESA decision Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Administration,l39 
influenced Congressional deliberations on the 1978 FESA amend- 
ments.140 It was the first Nebraska water project lawsuit based on the 
FXSA, foreshadowing what would happen under state endangered 
species statutes in Little Blue 11. 
The issue was the effect of the proposed Grayrocks dam and reser- 
voir on North Platte River flows from Wyoming into Nebraska. 
Grayrocks would impound approximately 104,000 acre feet of water,l41 
and is part of the Laramie River Station, a three unit 1500 megawatt 
coal-fired electric generating station located on the Laramie river near 
Id at 178. The Court quoted from H.R. Rep. No. 93-412,93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 , 4 5  
(1973). 
From the most narrow possible point of view, it is in the best interests 
of mankind to minimize the losses of genetic variation. The reason is 
simple: they are potential resources. They are keys to puzzles which we 
cannot solve, and may provide answers to questions which we have not 
yet learned to ask. 
To take a homely, but apt, example: one of the critical chemicals in 
the regulation of ovulations in humans was found in a common plant. 
Once discovered, and analyzed, humans could duplicate it synthetically, 
but had it never existed--or had it been driven out of existence before 
we knew its potentialities--we would never have tried to synthesize it in 
the first place. 
Who knows, or can say, what potential cures for cancer or other 
scourges, present or future, may lie locked up in the structures of plants 
which may yet be undiscovered, much less analyzed? . . . Sheer self-inter- 
est impels us to be cautious. 
m A  v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 178 (1978) (emphasis in original). 
Id at 185-88. 
Id at 189-93. 
Id at 193-95. Justices Powell, Blackmun and Rehnquist dissented. 
Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 ENV'T REP. CAS. (BNA) 1156 (D. 
Neb. 1978). 
The Tellico and Grayrocks dams, were the first two projects to be evaluated for 
critical habitat protection exemptions under the 1978 amendments. Endangered 
Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, $ 5(i), 92 Stat. 3751, 3761. 
Letter from Lynn A Greenwalt, Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to Lt. 
Gen. John W. Morris, Chief, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 4 (December 8,1978) 
(discussing effects of Grayrocks on Central Platte critical crane habitat) berein- 
after Grayrocks Biological Opinion]. 
An acre foot of water is enough water to cover an acre of land to a depth of 
one foot, or 325,851 gallons. R. HAF~NSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at 7. 
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Wheatland, Wyoming.14 The Laramie River Station is part of the 
Missouri Basin Power Project, a joint regional power supply project of 
six consumer-owned electric systems, then including the Lincoln Elec- 
tric System. The project manager is Basin Electric Power Coopera- 
tive, Project financing was based on Rural Electrification 
Administration (REA) loan guarantees. 
The Laramie River is the major tributary to the North Platte River 
in Wyoming, contributing approximately seventeen percent of its an- 
nual flow at the Nebraska-Wyoming border.143 The power project 
alone would have reduced flows into Nebraska by approximately 
23,000 acre feet of water per year.144 An additional 22,500 acre feet of 
water from Grayrocks was to be allocated to the proposed Corn Creek 
irrigation project.145 The North Platte River was allocated by Ne- 
braska v. Wgoming,l46 in which a divided C o w  granted Nebraska 
seventy-five percent of the river flow. The allocation of the Laramie 
River, however, is subject to some dispute.147 The flow reductions 
from Grayrocks would most directly have affected water storage in 
Lake McConaughy for irrigation and power production purposes. The 
flow reductions also had the potential to impact whooping crane 
habitat designated critical by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) 
in the Central Platte river region.148 The Central Nebraska Public 
Power and Irrigation District (Tri-County), which owns and operates 
Lake McConaughy, sought to have the Nebraska Attorney General 
challenge Grayrocks for violating the North Platte River decree of Ne- 
braska v. Wyoming.149 When Nebraska did file suit, however, it al- 
142. Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 WT. REP. CAS. (BNA) 1156, 1157 
(D. Neb. 1978). 
143. Id at 1161. 
144. Grayrocks Biological Opinion, supra note 141, a t  12. 
145. Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 ENV'T. REP. CAS. (BNA) at 1156, 
1164 (D. Neb. 1978). 
146. 325 U.S. 589 (1945). 
147. Professor Tarlock suggests that the Laramie River was not affected by the Ne- 
braska v. Wyoming decree because the Laramie had been apportioned between 
Colorado and Wyoming in Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922). Tarlock, 
supra note 114, at 20 n.97. Nebraska irrigation interests are not yet willing to 
concede that, however. 
148. On May 15,1978, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, 
designated the "Platte River bottoms" from Lexington to Shelton as critical 
habitat for the endangered Whooping Crane. 43 Fed. Reg. 20,938, 20,941 (1978) 
(codified at  50 C.F.R. $17.95(b) (1985)). The Platte River bottoms are defined as 
the Platte River channel and immediately adjacent wetlands. Id at 20,938. The 
designation is in the heart of the Platte River, where several proposed water de- 
velopment projects would either divert or impound water for irrigation. The 
Central Platte critical habitat designation would later drive the legal and political 
impasse over Platte River water projects leading to LB 1106. 
149. The author attended a dinner sponsored by Tri-County some months prior to the 
filing of the case. At the dinner, Tri-County officials lobbied the Attorney Gen- 
eral's office to file suit but not on NEPA or FESA grounds. Tri-County, being in 
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leged NEPA and FESA violations. 
The suit sought to enjoin construction of Grayrocks by Basin Elec- 
tric, alleging that the REA had violated NEPA and FESA in (1) failing 
to consider the project's environmental impacts in making loan guar- 
antees of approximately $120 million,l50 and (2) in failing to insure 
that critical habitat was not jeopardized as required by section 7 of 
FESA. The suit also alleged that the Army Corps of Engineers had 
similarly failed to consider the project's environmental impacts in Ne- 
braska and had similarly failed to insure that critical habitat in Ne- 
braska was not jeopardized when the Corps granted a section 404 
dredge and fill permit.151 Nebraska was joined in its suit by national 
wildlife groups and their local affiliates, which significantly affected 
the terms of the settlement.152 
The court ruled that the REA's EIS was deficient and should have 
included an evaluation of (1) the possible impacts of Grayrocks on 
downstream fish and wildlife habitat,l53 (2) the effect of other pro- 
posed water depletions,l54 (3) the effect of project ground water 
the electricity generation business itself, did not oppose the power project as such 
although it would have preferred that project evaporation be reduced thorough 
nonevaporative water cooling methods. See Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Ad- 
min., 12 ENV'T REP. CAS. (BNA) 1156,1164 (D. Neb. 1978). Tri-County did oppose 
Basin Electric's agreement to provide water from Grayrocks to Corn Creek. 
There was general agreement that the suit was necessary to protect Nebraska 
irrigation interests. Environmental concerns were never considered. Water avail- 
ability from the North Platte River for endangered species in the Central Platte 
region (see supra note 149, regarding the Central Platte critical habitat designa- 
tion) would be little affected by developments upstream from McConaughy. 
However, Tri-County officials were strongly opposed to the suit's being filed on 
environmental grounds, realizing that any environmental allegations made 
against Grayrocks could be made just as easily (indeed, with greater justification) 
against pending Nebraska Platte River water projects. The Attorney General, 
however, realized that litigation under the Supreme Court decree would be very 
difficult and uncertain, and properly elected to file suit on NEPA and FESA vio- 
lations. Accord Tarlock, supra note 114, at 20. 
150. Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 ENV'T REP. CAS. (BNA) 1156, 1159 
(D. Neb. 1978), appeal vacated & dismissed, 594 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1979). 
151. Id at 1157. Separate proceedings against the REA and the Corps were consoli- 
dated in a single proceeding. Id 
152. Id at 1157. The national wildlife groups were the National Audubon Society, the 
National Wildlife Federation, and the Nebraska Wildlife Federation. AGREE 
MENT OF S ~ M E N T  AND COMPROMISE 12 (December 4, 1978) bereinafter 
SETTLE~~ENT]. 
153. Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 ENV'T REP. CAS. (BNA) 1156,1161- 
63 (D. Neb. 1978). The EIS had stopped measuring environmental impacts at the 
Nebraska-Wyoming border. 
154. Id at 1164-65. The court ruled that NEPA requires a consideration of the cumu- 
lative effect of the proposed action in light of other geographically and environ- 
mentally related actions, citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409-10, 413 
(1976). Corn Creek, the federally authorized Narrows irrigation project on the 
South Platte River in Colorado, and agricultural ground water pumping in Ne- 
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pumping in Wyoming,lss and (4) the effect of flow reductions on the 
fisheries downstream from McConaughy, Platte River ground water 
recharge, and Nebraska surface water irrigators.156 The court also 
ruled that the EIS prepared by the Corps was similarly deficient.157 
Regarding endangered species, the court ruled that the REA 
should have consulted with the FWS.158 FWS had sought consultation 
with REA, but the agency declined on the basis that REA itself had 
concluded that there were no adverse impacts on downstream critical 
habitat or endangered species.159 FWS then issued its jeopardy opin- 
ion,leo stating that Grayrocks would jeopardize the continued exist- 
ence of the whooping crane by destroying or adversely modifying its 
critical habitat, and indicated that further studies would be needed261 
braska's Platte River valley were determined to be necessary considerations in 
the EIS. Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 ENV'T REP. CM. (BNA) 
1156, 1164-65 (D. Neb. 1978). 
155. Nebraska v. RuraI Electrification Admin., 12 ENV'T REP. CAS. 1156, 1167-68 (D. 
Neb. 1978). 
156. Id at ll69. 
157. Id at 1180. 
158. Id. at 1169-71. 
159. Regarding the propriety of the REA's making its own determination of no jeop- 
ardy, the court stated, 
As to the first point-that REA was justified in concluding that no 
adverse impact on the habitat had been demonstrated at the time of the 
making of the guarantee commitments]-the difficulty is that the 
Endangered Species Act places the burden upon the agencies who are 
authorizing, funding, or cafiying out programs to insure that those pro- 
grams do not jeopardize endangered species or the habitat of the species. 
The burden is not upon someone else to demonstrate that there will be 
an adverse impact. It may well be true that REA was justified in con- 
cluding that no adverse impact has been demonstrated, but the question 
is whether it has met its burden of insuring that there wiU be no jeop- 
ardy. Unless ItEA has done that, it has not complied with the Act. That 
is true, even though the whooping crane issue was first raised well after 
many of the plans had been made and a great deal of money already 
spent. This is one of the principal teachings of Tennessee Valley Author- 
ity v. HZ. . . . 
Id at 1171 (emphasis in original). 
160. Under the 1978 amendments, the opinion of a Secretary is the result of the FWS 
interagency consultation, stating FWSJs conclusions regarding the effects of the 
proposed agency action on endangered species and their habitat. 16 U.S.C. 
5 1536(b) (1982). See i d r a  text accompanying notes 175-77. If the biological opin- 
ion concludes that the proposed agency action will jeopardize the continued exist- 
ence of endangered species and their habitat the opinion is often referred to as a 
jeopardy opinion. 
161. Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 ENV'T REP. CAS. (BNA) 1156, 1170 
(D. Neb. 1978). After the Grayrocks decision the Corps requested consultation 
with FWS. Grayrocks Biological Opinion, supra note 141, at 1. The FWS reiter- 
ated its earlier conclusion that Grayrocks would jeopardize the continued exist- 
ence of the whooping crane by destroying or  adversely modifying its critical 
habitat. FWS proposed two alternatives that would avoid jeopardy: that Basin 
Electric either (1) replace the water removed from the Laramie River at the ap- 
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The court also ruled that REA (and the Corps) had a duty under sec- 
tion 7 of FESA to insure endangered species or their critical habitat 
would not be jeopardized.162 Finally, the court determined that REA 
had violated F'WS regulations prohibiting an irreversible or irretriev- 
able commitment of federal resources. The action of REA foreclosed 
consideration of modifications or alternatives to the proposed agency 
action before FWS consultation was completed and a biological opin- 
ion could be issued.163 The court also determined that the Corps had 
violated the same FESA requirements.la The court set aside the 
REA loan guarantees and the Corps' section 404 permit as unlawful.165 
With the adverse ruling, Basin Electric was faced with the prospect 
of having to prepare a new EIS, taking the potential effect of 
Grayrocks on the downstream critical habitat into consideration.166 
As this would have taken several months, if not years, especially if the 
adequacy of the new EIS were litigated, Basin elected to settle the 
case. The settlement had to satisfy both the Nebraska irrigation inter- 
ests responsible for initiating the suit and the wildlife interests that 
had joined the suit. It also had to take into account the 1978 FESA 
Amendments, to which we now turn.167 
1978 Amendments. The Tellico decision led to a public outcry that 
the FESA valued a three inch fish above a $120 million dam represent- 
ing economic progress.168 Congressional reactions were grouped in 
three camps: (1) retaining the FESA as interpreted in TVA v. Hill 
with no amendment, (2) amending the FESA to exempt projects 
which were significantly under way when the FESA was adopted, or 
(3) develop a method for conflict resolution on a case by case 
rnethod.169 The latter view prevailed and resulted in the 1978 FESA 
proximate time the water was being removed, or (2) establish a trust for the 
maintenance and improvement of whooping crane habitat on the Platte River. 
Id at 18. 
162. Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 ENV'T REP. CAS. (BNA) 1156,1171- 
72 (D. Neb. 1978). 
163. Id at 1172. 
164. Id at 1172-73. The court determined that the issuance of the 4 404 permit was 
premature; the Corps failed to consider the environmental effects of other water 
depletions (Corn Creek, Narrows, and Nebraska groundwater pumping), poten- 
tial damage to the Lake McConaughy trout fishery, and the effects of reduced 
North Platte River flows on Nebraska ground water resources and Nebraska ag- 
ricultural activities. Id  at 1175-77. 
165. Id at 1180-81. 
166. It  is common practice for the applicant for a federal permit, license, funding, etc. 
to prepare a draft EIS itself which is then presented to the agency responsible for 
preparing the EIS. The circuits are divided on whether this practice is acceptable. 
See Fisher, The CEQ Regularions: New Stage in the Evolution of NEPA, 3 HARV. 
E m  L.REV. 347, 369-70 (1979). 
167. The Grayrocks settlement is discussed id ra  text accompanying notes 193-95. 
168. Comment, supra note 120, at 298. 
169- Id  at 299. 
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amendments.170 
The most important change made by the 1978 amendments was the 
exemption procedure added to section 7. Under the 1973 act, section 7 
required federal agencies to consult with the Interior Secretary re- 
garding the potential impacts of agency action on listed species or 
their critical habitat, and to then insure that the agency's action did 
not jeopardize listed species or their critical habitat.171 The section 7 
consultation requirement, now denominated section ?(a), reads: 
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the 
Secretary, insure that any action authorized, funded or carried out by such 
agency (hereinafter referred to in this section as an "agency action") is not 
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or 
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of 
habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary, after consulta- 
tion as appropriate with affected States, to be critical, unless such agency has 
been granted an exemption for such action by the [Endangered Species] Com- 
mittee pursuant to subsection (h) of this section.172 
The only major changes in the section 7(a) consultation requirement, 
aside from the exemption possibility and additional consultation pro- 
cedures, are the definition of agency action and the clarification that 
only adverse habitat modifications need be prevented. Thus the basic 
duties to consult and to insure no jeopardy were preserved in the 1978 
amendments. 
The consultation procedure was expanded and formalized in the 
1978 amendments. Consultation must be concluded within ninety 
days, and the Secretary must issue a "Secretary's opinion" stating the 
Secretary's position and summarizing the information upon which it is 
based, detailing how the proposed agency action would affect the spe- 
cies or its habitat.173 The Secretary must also suggest any "reasonable 
and prudent alternatives" that the Secretary believes would avoid 
jeopardy.174 Federal agencies are prohibited from making irreversible 
resource commitments foreclosing implementation of any prudent al- 
170. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 
(1978) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 153236,1538-40, 1542 (1982 & Supp. I 
1983)). For a discussion of the legislative debate over the 1978 amendments, see 
Comment supra note 120, at  299-309. 
The 1978 amendments defined critical habitat which had not been previously 
defined, and required the Interior Secretary to identify critical habitat when pro- 
posing to list endangered species. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(5), 1533(a) (1978). In 1982, 
the current cost-benefit requirement for critical habitat designation was added. 
Critical habitat designations must take into account the economic impact and 
other relevant impacts of the habitat designation. Id a t  $1533(b)(4). The Secre- 
tary may excIude an area from critical habitat designation if the benefits of exclu- 
sion outweigh the benefits of listing unless the best available scientific and 
commercial data indicate that exclusion will result in species extinction. Id 
171. 16 U.S.C. 4 1536 (1976). 
172. Id at $ 1536(a)(2). 
173. Id $1536(b). 
174. Id 
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ternatives which would avoid jeopardy.175 
Exemptions may be obtained for jeopardy agency actions for which 
there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives, if the agency action 
benefits clearly outweigh the jeopardy caused, the agency action is in 
the public interest and of regional or national significance, and the 
jeopardy can be mitigated.176 Agencies, governors of states in which 
the proposed agency action would occur, or permit or license appli- 
cants may apply for an exemption if consultation indicates that jeop- 
ardy may occur.177 The exemption application is initially considered 
by a review committee, with the final determination being made by 
the Endangered Species Committee.l?s 
The review board is composed of three individuals: one appointed 
by Interior Secretary, one state representative appointed by the Presi- 
dent based upon gubernatorial nominations, and one administrative 
law judge.179 The board reviews the exemption application and re- 
ports its findings to the Committee.ls0 The board must determine by a 
majority vote (1) whether the proposed action would jeopardize en- 
dangered species or their habitat, and (2) whether such exemption ap- 
plicant has acted in good faith in attempting to comply with 
endangered species requirements.181 If the board determines that 
these criteria are met, it submits a report to the Committee discussing 
available alternatives, whether the proposed agency action is in the 
public interest and of national or regional significance, and proposed 
mitigation and enhancement measures.182 
The Endangered Species Committee makes a final decision on the 
exemption application with ninety days of receiving the review board 
report.183 The Committee is composed of seven members: the Secre- 
tary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of the 
Council of Economic Advisors, the EPA Administrator, the Secretary 
of the Interior, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra- 
tion, and a state representative appointed by the president based on 
175. Id $1536(b), (d). This provision codified the earlier FWS endangered species reg- 
ulations enforced by the court in Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Adrnin., 12 
ENV'T REP. CAS.(BNA) 1156 (D. Neb. 1978). 
176. 16 U.S.C. 8 1536(h)(1) (1982). 
177. Id. $1536(g)(l). The application must state the reasons why the applicant be- 
lieves it would qualify for an exemption. Id  at § 1536(g)(2)(A). Any federal 
agency applying for an exemption must in its application include a statement 
describing why the proposed agency action cannot be altered or modified to avoid 
jeopardy. Id at $ 1536(f). 
178. I d  8 1536(g)(l). 
179. Id, 1536(g) (3)(A)(i)-(iii). 
180. Id $ 1536(g)(3)(A). 
181. Id. 5 1536(g)(5). 
182. Id. 8 1536(g)(6)-(7). 
183. Id. 3 1536(h)(1). 
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gubernatorial nominations.184 The Committee must grant an exemp- 
tion if, with at least five members voting, it determines that (1) there 
are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action, 
(2) the benefits of the agency action clearly outweigh the benefits of 
alternative courses of action avoiding jeopardy, and the action is in the 
public interest, (3) the action is of regional or national significance, 
and (4) the Committee establishes mitigation requirements to mini- 
mize jeopardy.185 
In addition to the general exemption procedure, the 1978 arnend- 
ments required the Committee to conduct an expedited consideration 
of exemptions for Tellico and Grayrocks within ninety days of the 
Act's effective date. Project exemptions would be granted if there 
were no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the projects, if the pro- . 
ject benefits clearly outweighed alternative courses of actions avoiding 
jeopardy, and if the projects were in the public interest.186 
Tellico. The Committee unanimously rejected the Tellico exemp- 
tion application.187 The Committee concluded that there was a rea- 
sonable and prudent alternative to the agency action and that the 
benefits of the proposed agency action did not clearly outweigh the 
benefits of alternative actions avoiding jeopardy.188 The Committee 
determined that the benefits from not completing the dam and reser- 
voir were greater than those from completing Tellico.ls9 Congress 
subsequently exempted Tellico from FESA and "any other law" 
prohibiting its construction.l90 
184. Id g 1536(e)(3). 
185. Id a t  5 1536(h)(l). Any exemptions granted are permanent exemptions if a bio- 
logical assessment has been conducted, unless the Secretary determines that the 
exemption will result in extinction of a species not identified in the biological 
assessment. Id at 3 1536(h)(2)(A)-(B). If so, the Committee has 30 days within 
which to grant the exemption notwithstanding the exemption finding. Id at 
1536(h)(2)(B). Any takings of endangered or threatened species that occur pur- 
suant to an exempted action are not considered takings under the FESA. Ida t  
$ 1536(0). Incidental takings were authorized by the 1982 amendments if ap- 
proved by the Secretary. Id at $1539(a)(2) (B). The 1978 amendments also ad- 
ded a self-defense exception to the takings prohibition. Id at $1540(a)(3), (b)(3). 
186. Id Pub. L. No. 95-632, $5, 92 Stat. 3761. The requirements for the Tellico and 
Grayrocks exemptions were the same as for exemptions generally except that the 
regional and national significance and mitigation requirements were waived. 
However, the amendments imposed a no jeopardy requirement on the Missouri 
Basin Power Project (i.e., Grayrocks) should jeopardy be indicated in a biological 
opinion. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632,s 5,92 
Stat. 3761 (1982). 
187. ENDANGERED SPECIES C O M M I ~ E ,  U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, APPLICATION FOR EX- 
EhlFTION FOR TELLICO DAM AND RESERVOIR PROJECT 1, 4 (1979). 
188. Id a t  2. 
189. Id at 24. 
190. Energy and Water Development Appropriation of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-69,93 Stat. 
449 (1979). See Goplerud, The Endangered Species Act: Does I t  Jeopardize the 
Continued Existence of Species?, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 487, 507. 
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Grayrocks. After conclusion of the Grayrocks litigation the parties 
elected to seek a settlement. Principal terms of the settlement were 
(1) agreeing to reduce project water consumption principally to satisfy 
Nebraska irrigation interests (represented by the state of Ne- 
braska)lgl and (2) to establish the $7.5 million Platte River Whooping 
Crane Habitat Maintenance Trust.192 The Endangered Species Com- 
mittee granted the project an exemption, stipulating that the mitiga- 
tion requirements contained in the settlement agreement be 
irnplemented.193 
The FESA established, in effect, regulatory water rights for endan- 
gered species and their habitat to which federal water projects were 
subject. FESA litigation delayed at least two federal major water 
projects, forcing significant environmental concessions in Grayrocks. 
Grayrocks, in addition to the earlier Norden dam decision, sent a col- 
lective shiver through Nebraska irrigation interests. Prior to these de- 
cisions, Nebraska water developers had enjoyed the belief that federal 
environmental restrictions would not affect their water projects. Nor- 
den and Grayrocks proved conclusively that this belief was wrong. 
The FESA was to play another crucial role in Nebraska water poli- 
tics. A state endangered species act, enacted to qualify for federal en- 
dangered species program funding, would contain a consultation/no- 
jeopardy requirement very similar to F'ESA7s section 7.194 The state 
consultation/no-jeopardy requirement would temporarily derail all 
Platte River water projects, creating one of the major political pres- 
sures leading to LB 1106. 
E. Water Policies for the Future 
While federal environmental legislation was creating legal road- 
191. SETTLEMENT, supra note 152, at 4. 
192. Id The primary purpose of the trust is to protect and maintain the Central Platte 
critical habitat. The Platte River Whooping Crane Habitat Maintenance Trust 
Declaration 2 (Dec. 4,1978). The trustees are authorized to, among other things, 
purchase land and water rights for habitat maintenance and to manage habitat 
controlled by the trust (including maintaining the open roosting areas in sandbars 
and other riparian habitat areas by keeping them clear of trees and similar vege- 
tation). Id. 3-4. Regarding the whooping crane's habitat needs and habitat main- 
tenance requirements, see U.S. DEPARTMENT O F  THE INTERIOR, GFL4YROCKS DAM 
AND RESERVOIR: STAFF REPORT TO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES COMMITTEE 4.3-4.4, 
4.11-4.12 (1979). 
Basin Electric resented the role of Nebraska irrigation interests in instigating 
the Grayrocks litigation, and has sought unsuccessfully to intervene on behalf of 
endangered species in water appropriation proceedings in Nebraska. Basin Elec. 
Power Co-op. v. Little Blue Natural Resources Dist., 219 Neb. 372,363 N.W.2d 500 
(1985). 
193. ENDANGERED SPECIES COMMITTEE, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, APPLICATION FOR EX- 
EMPTION FOR GRAYROCKS DAM AND RESERVOIR PROJECT 3 (1979). 
194. See infra text accompanying notes 238-40. 
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blocks for implementing irrigation projects, water project financing 
and the substantial federal subsidy involved also came under scrutiny. 
Federal reclamation projects have been heavily subsidized, first from 
public land sales and later from direct congressional appropriations 
and power revenues. In addition, reclamation project beneficiaries are 
not required to pay interest on project construction funds.195 The rec- 
lamation subsidies were initially justified as  encouraging settlement of 
the West, and later, during the Depression, as providing needed public 
employment. Those justifications have since lost their basis. 
- ~ 
The first critical examination of federal cost-sharing policies on 
water projects came in the final report of the National Water CommiR- 
sion (NWC).196 The NWC was established in 1968 to examine national 
water problems and policies.197 The NWC final report addressed 
many topics, ranging from Indian and federal reserved water rights to 
interbasin water transfers.]-98 However, probably the most controver- 
sial NWC recommendations dealt with integrating a "user pay" princi- 
ple into federal water project financing policies.199 In this regard the 
NWC report was very important, as it politically legitimized criticism 
of federal reclamation projects on economic grounds. 
The final report noted the important federal subsidy of irrigation 
projects. 
A primary weakness of the Federal water resources development projects is 
that they have been heavily subsidized by the Federal Government; that is, by 
all the taxpayers of the Nation, to provide benefits for a few. The water users 
on some modern Federal Reclamation projects, for example, repay no more 
than 10 percent of the construction costs attributable to irrigation, the remain- 
ing cost being borne by the Federal Government in three ways: [I] by not 
requiring water users to reimburse the Treasury for the interest on the capital 
advanced for project construction, [2] by permitting power revenues and some- 
times other nonirrigation revenues to be credited towards irrigation reim- 
bursement, and 133 by allocating an unduly large part of the costs to 
nonreimbursable purposes.200 
195. For a discussion of the financing of reclamation projects, see supra text accompa- 
nying notes 51-59. 
196. WATER POLICIES FOR THE m, supra note 40. 
197. Pub. L. No. 90-515, 82 Stat. 868 (1968). Regarding earlier national water study 
commissions, see HOW I, supra note 1, at  6, 4043; H o ~ n m  11, supra note 2, a t  
37-52. 
198. For a general discussion of the recommendations made by the Commission, see 
Meyers, The Busy Practitioner's Chide to the National Water Commission Re- 
port, 19 ROCKY MTN. MN. L. INST. 513 (1974). Legal studies prepared for the 
hWC are the most useful materials on water law available- For a list of NWC 
legal studies, see WATER POLICIES FOR THE supra note 40, at  544-45, 547, 
551-53. 
199. Meyers, supra note 198, at  51416. 
200. WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 40, at  128. (Nonreimbursable costs 
include cost for navigation, flood control, fish, wildlife, and recreation benefits. 
Sax, supra note 50, at 144.) The NWC report cites testimony that irrigators in the 
Columbia River basin project in Washington paid less than 8% of the cost of deliv- 
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The NWC then noted that the probable effect of the subsidy on irriga- 
tors is wasteful water use.201 While irrigation project subsidies do 
benefit irrigators, the NWC concluded that they were not in the na- 
tional interest because farmers used publicly subsidized irrigation 
water from reclamation projects to grow surplus crops for which fed- 
eral price supports were (and are) available, increasing the cost of the 
price support programs. 
The Commission finds . . . that to continue subsidization of new irrigation 
projects does have serious disadvantages for the Nation. The most serious is 
the expansion of the productive capacity of the Nation's agricultural plant 
when there is a surplus of many crops-a surplus that is expected to continue 
into the future. Reclamation projects add to that surplus, to the detriment of 
farmers already in business and at a high cost to the taxpayer. Not only must 
the taxpayer pay a large portion of the costs of bringing new land into produc- 
tion [via irrigation projects], but he must also pay for farm price-support pro- 
grams, the cost of which go up as farm production of price-supported crops 
increases. . . . 
It is doubtful that taxpayers as consumers benefit greatly from these price- 
support expenditures or from subsidizing irrigation projects. For those crops 
which come under farm price-support programs, prices a t  the food store will 
be as high as they would otherwise be. But with greater production from sub- 
sidized irrigation, more tax funds will be required (1) to maintain price-sup 
port levels and (2) to underwrite the irrigation subsidy.202 
The Commission concludes that subsidization of new irrigation projects is 
not justified on.. . economic grounds.. . . Nederally subsidized irrigation does 
increase farm surpluses, increasing the costs of price-support programs and 
disadvantaging farmers in other parts of the country. Direct beneficiaries of 
Federal irrigation developments should, therefore, be compelled to pay in full 
the costs of projects allocation to irrigation in conformity to the general princi- 
ple of full-cost repayment proposed for other water development projects else- 
where in this report.203 
In its formal conclusions the NWC recommended new federal water 
project cost-sharing legislation be developed, and that irrigators be re- 
quired to pay their proportionate share of reclamation project costs, 
ering water to irrigated fields. Gross (not net) crop receipts would cover only 
53% of the costs of irrigation water. In that project, irrigators would pay less than 
24% of total project costs; the balance would be covered by hydroelectric power 
revenues. WATER POLICIES FOR THE F'UTURE, supra note 40, at 129-30. 
201. "When irrigators receive water on a subsidized basis, incentives to use water care- 
fully and efficiently are often removed. Where water is priced substantially be- 
low cost, it will be to the advantage of irrigators to be lavish in its use and 
neglectful of programs to stretch supplies and improve the productivity of water." 
WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 40, at 129. 
202. Id at 147-48. Earlier in its report the NWC detailed the effect of the then current 
and projected crop surpluses on future federal reclamation projects. The Com- 
mission concluded that subsidized water development could not be justified by a 
need to increase agricultural production since current capacity should be ade- 
quate until at least the year 2000. Id at 141-42, 
203. Id at 148. When the NWC report was published approximately 37% of land im- 
gated with reclamation water produced price-supported crops. Id at 129. 
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including interest.204 
The NWC report signaled the end of an era regarding public atti- 
tudes towards reclamation projects. No longer would reclamation 
projects automatically be assumed to be worthy of significant public 
subsidies. The West had been won, the Depression was over, and irri- 
gation projects should therefore be evaluated on a more conventional 
basis: whether they represented a sound investment which could 
meet realistic payback requirements. Unfortunately the NWC recom- 
mendations were politically ahead of their time. The recomrnenda- 
tions were not embraced by Congress, which traditionally has been 
reluctant to adopt reclamation policy reforms.205 However, the 
NWC's recommendations were revived in 1978 with President Carter's 
water project hit list and water policy proposals. The project funding 
stalemate which has resulted from the Carter water policy initiatives 
may lead to the ultimate implementation of NWC recommendations. 
F. Ground Water Management: Regulations and Rescue Projects 
The original purpose of the reclamation project was to allow farm- 
ers in river valleys to reclaim arid lands to cultivation under irrigation. 
However, irrigation projects have also been developed to supply irriga- 
tion and municipal water to regions where ground water supplies were 
being depleted, most notably in southern Califomia.206 This rescue 
project207 aspect of new reclamation projects has become the driving 
force for surface water development as regions of Nebraska dependent 
on ground water irrigation realize that local ground water supplies ul- 
timately will be depleted and a source of supplemental water will be 
needed to maintain irrigation. 
Ground water has been the major source of irrigation water in Ne- 
braska since the late 1950s.208 Of the 7.3 million acres irrigated in Ne- 
braska, 6.2 million are irrigated with ground water.209 As a result of 
this heavy ground water use for irrigation210 several areas of the state 
204, Id at 497. 
205. See HOLMES I,supra note 1, at 31-38. 
206. Aiken, supra note 66, a t  934-35; Aiken, Oround Water Mining Law and Policy, 53 
COLO. L. REV. 505,518-21 (1982) bereinafter Ground Water Mining]. 
207. The term "rescue project" was coined by Professor Charles Corker. C. CORKER, 
GROUNDWATER LAW, MANAGEAENT AND ADMINISTRATION 256-60 (1971) (Nat'l 
Water Comm'n Report No, NWC-72-026, Legal Study No. 6). 
208. In 1959 the number of acres irrigated with ground water in Nebraska surpassed 
for the first time the number of acres irrigated with surface water. Aiken, supra 
note 66, at 948. 
209. M. ELLIS & D. PEDERSON, GROUND WATER LEVELS IN NEBRASKA, 1985, at 58 
(1986) (Neb. Water Survey Paper No. 61, Univ. of Neb. Conservation & Survey 
Div.). The statistics regarding the number of irrigated acres in Nebraska are not 
consistent. Aiken, supra note 66, at  918 n.5. 
210. Ground water use for irrigation constitutes 87% of total Nebraska ground water 
use and is the major reason that ground water levels are declining in several re- 
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are facing ground water depletion.211 Projections to the year 2020 sug- 
gest that approximately one million acres of land currently irrigated 
will be lost to irrigated production, and approximately one million 
acres will receive only partial irrigation because of ground water 
depletion.212 
Theoretically there are three public policy responses to the threat 
of ground water depletion: do nothing, regulate ground water devel- 
opment and use to stretch aquifer life, or develop a rescue project to 
substitute impounded surface water for depleted ground water.213 
Most western states have elected to merely regulate ground water de- 
velopment, i.e., installation of new wells in areas facing depletion, in 
effect rewarding those who caused the problem by allowing them to 
monopolize the remaining supply.214 California has pioneered the res- 
cue project approach of dealing with depletion by obtaining supple- 
mental water to maintain current uses.215 While Nebraska statutes 
have authorized ground water regulations to control depletion for the 
last decade, the hope of obtaining a rescue project has allowed Ne- 
braska irrigators to resist ground water controls. Probably the major 
reason LB 1106 was enacted was to facilitate development of rescue 
projects for Nebraska ground water irrigators, 
Nebraska was one of the last western states to authorize ground 
water regulations.216 Although depletion was apparent in the 1950s, 
ground water regulations were not authorized until the 1959 legisla- 
ture authorized irrigators to create ground water conservation dis- 
tricts (GWCDs).217 Effective ground water regulations did not 
gions of the state. See W. SOLLEY, E. CHASE & W. MANN, ESTIMATED USE OF 
WATER IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1980, a t  18, 36 (1983) (Geological Survey Circu- 
lar 1001, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Geological Survey); Aiken, supra note 66, at 
918-19. 
211. The regions include the Alliance area in Box Butte county; the Upper Republican 
area of Chase, Perkins and Dundy counties; the Central Platte area of Buffalo 
and Hall counties, the Little Blue area of Adams, Clay, Fillmore, Thayer, and 
Nuckolls counties; the Upper Big Blue area of Hamilton, York, Selvard and Polk 
counties, and the O'Neil [Holt county] area. M. ELLIS & D. PEDERSON, sup-a note 
209, a t  3. For a discussion of what constitutes ground water depletion, see Aiken, 
supra note 206, at 509-14. 
212. NEB. NATURAL RESOURCES COMMISSION, SUMMARY OF THE NEBRASKA RESEARCH 
FOR THE SIX STATE HIGH PLAINS OGALLALA QUIFER STUDY 28 (1981) [hereinaf- 
ter HIGH PLAINS STUDY]. 
213. See Aiken, supra note 66, at 930-35; Ground Water Mining, supra note 206, at 
513-14. 
214. Ground Water Mining, suwa  note 206, at 51418. 
215. See id. at 518-21. 
216. For a discussion of western ground water depletion statutes, see Aiken, supra 
note 66, at 931-34. 
217. Ground Water Conservation Act of Nebraska, 1959 Neb. Laws ch. 221, LB 554 
(codified at NEB. REV. STAT. $5 46-614 to -634 (1984)) (repealed, effective Jan. 1, 
1987). See Aiken, supra note 66, at 950-51. The GWCDs implemented ground 
water runoff controls, which subsequently were applied statewide in the Ground 
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develop until the 1975 Ground Water Management Act (GWMA) was 
enacted.218 The GWMA follows a local control rather than a state 
control philosophy in that local natural resources districts (NRDs) 
have the sole authority to initiate control area proceedings by request- 
ing the Nebraska Department of Water Resources (DWR) to hold a 
control area designation hearing.219 If the DWR determines that a 
control area should be designated,220 the NRD may (subject to DWR 
approval) regulate well spacing,221 require rotation of pumping, allo- 
cate the quantity of ground water to be withdrawn, and ban the instal- 
lation of new wells.222 
Six control area hearings have been requested by NRDs, but only 
three have been designated by the DWR,223 indicating that the state- 
Water Management Act. The GWCDs, in cooperation with the University of Ne- 
braska Extension Service, also pioneered demonstrations of irrigation scheduling, 
whereby crop water needs are monitored during the growing season and irriga- 
tion water applications are scheduled in quantity and amount to supply only as 
much water as the crop then requires. Id at 951 n.163. For a brief discussion of 
irrigation scheduling, see Aiken, The National Water Policy Review and Wesfem 
Water Rights Law Ref- An O V A ,  59 NEB. L. REV. 327, 329-33 (1980). 
Even though the GWCDs did not directly regulate ground water withdrawals, 
which would be necessary to significantly extend aquifer life, their experiences 
with runoff regulations and irrigation scheduling were significant in formulating 
subsequent ground water management policies. 
218. Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act 1975, Neb. Laws 1975, 
LB 577 (codified at  NEB. REV. STAT. $9 46-656 to -674 (1984 & 1986 Cum. Supp.)). 
See R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at  247-57; Aiken, supra note 
66, at  960-62; Aiken & Supalla, OrDund Water Mining and Western Water 
Rights: the Nebrmka Expaience, 24 S.D.L. REV. 607, 620-29 (1979). 
219. NEB. REV. STAT. 46-658(3) (1984 & 1986 Cum. Supp.). The fear of state regula- 
tion of ground water led to deletion on the floor of a provision authorizing the 
D W R  to initiate ground water control proceedings on its own motion. Aiken & 
Supdla, supra note 218, at  620. 
220. A control area may be designated if the D W R  director concludes, after a public 
hearing, that the uncontrolled development and use of ground water has caused 
or is likely to cause an inadequate ground water supply to meet present or reason- 
ably foreseeabIe needs. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-658(l)(a) (1984 & 1986 Cum. Supp.). 
In making that determination, the DWR director's considerations must include: 
(1) whether conflicts between ground water users are occurring or may reason- 
ably be anticipated, and (2) whether ground water users are experiencing, or 
likely to experience in the foreseeable future, substantial economic hardship as a 
direct result of current or anticipated ground water development or use. Id $46- 
658(2). 
221. State statutes require new irrigation wells to be located at least 600 feet from 
existing registered irrigation wells owned by another and at least 1000 feet away 
from existing registered municipal or industrial wells. NEB. REV. STAT. 8 S 46- 
609, -651 (1984). Greater spacing requirements may be established in control ar- 
eas. For a more complete discussion of well-spacing statutes see R. HARNSBERGER 
& N. THORSON, supra note 7, at  231-33. For a discussion of well registration re- 
quirements, see Aiken, supra note 66, at 976-80; R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, 
supra note 7, at  230-31. 
222. NEB. REV. STAT. 8 46-666(1)(5) (1984 & 1986 Cum. Supp.). 
223. Aiken, supra note 66, at 96267. All three unsuccessful control areas designation 
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local checks and balances built into the GWMA were present.224 Of 
the three control areas designated, in only the Upper Republican con- 
trol area has the NRD adopted regulations with the potential to signif- 
icantly extend aquifer life through reduced irrigation withdrawals.2w 
Control area irrigators, and irrigators in other regions facing ground 
water depletion22-e looking to the Platte River to supply water for 
rescue projects to supplement declining ground water supplies and to 
forestall imposition of ground water controls.227 
requests were denied by the DWR director on the basis that the problems com- 
plained of were simply well interference problems. Id at 962-63,965-67. The last 
unsuccessful control area designation request, made by the Lower Loup NRD to 
deal with well interference, soil erosion, and water quality problems associated 
with sandhills irrigation development, was denied on the additional basis that 
erosion and water quality concerns were beyond the scope of the GWMA. Id at 
966-67. The GWMA was subsequently amended to address ground water pollu- 
tion from irrigation. Act of May 15,1981,1981 Neb. Laws, LB 146,s 6 (codified at 
NEB. REV. STAT. 5 46-658(1)(b) (1984)) repealed by 1986 Neb. Laws, LB 894, 4 22. 
224. The requirement for DWR approval of control area designation requests re- 
flected the conservative philosophy that control area designation should be lim- 
ited to circumstances where controls are truly needed to deal with depletion, and 
that one state role should be to prevent hasty NRD action in reaction to local 
ground water concerns. The $46-658(1) designation requirement of present or 
prospective inadequacy of ground water supply, the condition not met for the 
three unsuccessful control area designation requests, precludes control areas be- 
ing used as a method for dealing with well interference conflicts if depletion is 
not present or imminent. 
225. The political difficulty associated with adopting effective ground water controls, 
aside from the obvious one of interfering with the farmer's traditional freedom in 
making agricultural production decisions, is that irrigators will ultimately be re- 
quired to reduce irrigated acreage, grow crops using less water, or both to live 
within their reduced allocations. The benefit of this, of course, is that irrigators 
will irrigate longer than they could if they were not regulated. See Croud 
Water Mining, supra note 206, a t  507, 512-13, 517-18. 
226. The areas facing depletion that have not requested control area designation in- 
clude the O'Neill area of Holt county, where Lower Niobrara NRD irrigators 
hope to be served by the Norden irrigation project; the Central Platte area within 
Hall and Buffalo counties, where Central Platte NRD irrigators hope to be served 
by the Prairie Bend and Twin Valley irrigation projects; and the Alliance area in 
Box Butte county where Upper Niobrara-White NRD irrigators have not yet be- 
gun to pursue either a rescue project or ground water controls. M. ELLIS & D. 
PEDERSON, supra note 209, at 3; NEB. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, SUMMARY OF 
PROPOSED PROJECTS FROM THE PLATTE AND SOUTH PLATTE RIVERS (1985) bere- 
inafter P L A ~  PROJECTS SUMMARY] (copy available from author upon request). 
227. All three control area NRDs have their own rescue project that they are pursu- 
ing: the Enders project for the Upper Republican, Catherland for the Little Blue 
NRD, and the Landmark project for the Upper Big Blue NRD. Pwrn: PROJECTS 
S ~ Y ,  supra note 226. Of the three, however, only the Upper Republican 
NRD is also implementing a ground water control strategy to slow depletion. 
The Enders application was denied by the Department of Water Resources. 
Application A-15738 for a Permit to Divert Water from the South Platte River for 
Storage in Enders Reservoir, (Nov. 4, 1985) (Neb. Dep't of Water Resources) 
(copy available from author upon request). The application was denied, because 
sufficient unappropriated water was not available for appropriation. Id at 5. The 
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The GWMA became the Ground Water Management and Protec- 
tion Act (GMPA) in 1981. The denial of control area status for the 
Lower Loup NRD was the impetus for expanding the GWMA to in- 
clude ground water quality protection as a control area designation 
and administration objective.228 However no NRD has attempted to 
utilize this new feature of the statute. The GMPA was expanded 
again in 1982 when ground water management areas were established 
as an alternative to ground water control areas.229 Management areas 
may be established unilaterally by an NRD after it has prepared a 
ground water management plan. The plan must include establish- 
ment of a ground water reservoir life goal and a discussion of how 
ground water controls would be used to accomplish that life goal.230 
Management plans have been prepared by all NRDs as required by LB 
1106,231 but no management areas have been implemented. 
The GmTMA (and subsequently the GMPA) have provided NRDs 
with administrative authorities which would extend aquifer life by re- 
ducing ground water withdrawals.232 However, the local option fea- 
DWR director also concluded that the applicants had not meet the burden of 
proof that the proposed reservoir would not jeopardize downstream endangered 
species or their habitat. Id at 11. The order denying the appropriation is on a p  
peal to  the Nebraska Supreme Court. 
228. Groundwater Management and Protection Act, 1981 Neb. Laws, LB 146,s 6 (codi- 
fied at  NEB. REV. STAT. $ 46-658(1)@) (1984)) repealed by 1986 Neb. Laws, LB 894, 
22. Regarding the Lower Loup control area denial, see Aiken, mp7a note 66, at  
966-67. Interestingly, the Lower Loup did not reapply for control area designation 
when designation criteria were expanded to include ground water pollution re- 
sulting from irrigation. 
229. Act of March 11,1982,1982 Neb. Laws, LB 375 (codified at  NEB. REV. STAT. 4 46- 
673.01 to -673.13 (1984 & 1986 Cum. Supp.)). See R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, 
mpra note 7, at  257-61. 
230. NEB. REV. STAT. 5 46-673.01(12), (13) (1984). Authorized management area regu- 
lations parallel authorized control area regulations. Id at $46-673.09 (1984 & 
1986 Cum. Supp). However, well drilling moratoria are not available in manage- 
ment areas. Id Well spacing restrictions may be imposed o d y  to the extent that 
they would not preclude a landowner from developing irrigation. Id at 5 46- 
673.12 (1984). If ground water allocations are established, they must be based on 
the number of acres being irrigated, rather than on another basis (such as irriga- 
ble acres). Id at 4 46-673.10. The irrigated acres requirement is a response to the 
realization that ground water allocations could be used to restrict irrigation to 
lands that met land suitability criteria if water were allocated on the basis of land 
suitability rather than water availability. Such an approach would have severely 
limited irrigation development in the Nebraska sandhills where most land is un- 
suited for irrigation due to steep slopes and sandy soils. See NEBMKA NATURAL 
R~somc~s COL~MISSION, MGRESS REPORT ON THE SANDHILLS AREA 
S ~ u ~ ~ ( 1 9 8 4 ) .  For a discussion of alternative bases of ground water allocation, see 
Aiken & Supalla, supra note 218, a t  635-37. 
231. Act of April 10,1984,1984 Neb. Laws, LB ll06, $ 37, (codified at  NEB. REV. STAT. 
3 46-673.01 (1984)). 
232. Regarding the effect of ground water regulations on aquifer life, see Ground 
Water Mining, supra note 206, at  509-14. 
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ture233 and the lure of rescue projects have combined to create a 
political climate in which effective controls have been rejected in all 
but the Upper Republican control area. The hope of developing a res- 
cue project has led to a de facto do nothing ground water management 
approach in Nebraska as irrigators politically resist imposition of 
ground water controls on the ground that the rescue project will ex- 
tend aquifer life just as ground water controls would, although in a 
different fashion. Nebraska should consider the recently enacted Ari- 
zona statute which authorizes state officials to require ground water 
controls to control depletion,234 particularly given the limited effect 
rescue projects can have in sustaining ground water based irrigation in 
Nebraska.235 
G. Nebraska Endangered Species Act 
In addition to the GWMA, the 1975 Nebraska Unicameral enacted 
the Nebraska Endangered Species Act (NESA).236 NESA was passed 
primarily to obtain federal funding for state endangered species pro- 
grams.237 However, section 6(3) of LB 145 (and the current statute) 
233. The requirement that only NRDs may initiate ground water control proceedings 
by requesting a DWR control area designation hearing has already been noted. 
This local control feature is compounded by a strong rural bias on NRD boards: 
NRD board members are not elected by population but rather by subdistricts. 
Board members are nominated by subdistricts based on area rather than popula- 
tion, and then are elected at large. NEB. REV. STAT. $2-3214(2), (3) (1983 & 1986 
Cum. Supp.). This gives rural residents (and in heavily irrigated NRDS, irriga- 
tors) a disproportionate voice in NRD governance. One wonders if NRDs would 
be so slow to act to deal with depletion if they were not dominated by irrigators 
reluctant to regulate themselves to stretch the life of local ground water supplies. 
234. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 9 45-412 to -414 (Supp. 1985). See generally Kyl, The 1980 
Arizona Groundwater Management Act: From Inception to Current Constitu- 
tional &lle?lge, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 471 (1982). 
235. Even if all hoped for rescue projects were developed, they would keep only a 
small fraction of the acres otherwise reverting to dryland production in irrigated 
production. See i?tfra text accompanying notes 35456. 
236. Nongame and Endangered Species Conservation Act, 1975 Neb. Laws, LB 145 
(codified at NEB. REV. STAT. $8 37-430 to -438 (1984)). LB 145 was based on a 
model bill drafted by professional wildlife conservation organizations and the 
Council on State Government. LB 145 Hearing 10 Committee on Constitutional 
Revision and Recreation Interim Study Committee, 84th Leg., 1st Sess. (Jan. 23, 
1975) (statement of Bill Bailey, Neb. Game &Parks Comm'n) bereinafter LB 145 
Hearing]. 
237. Federal grants for state endangered species programs meeting federal require- 
ments are available pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c) (1973) (amended 1978). 
It is the intent of LB 145 to provide adequate statutory authority to the 
Game and Parks Commission to enter into a cooperative agreement with 
the Federal Government as provided by the Endangered Species Act of 
1973. Entry into such agreement would: (1) preclude federal pre-emp 
tion of the State's authority to regulate the "taking" of resident 
threatened or endangered wildlife and (2) make the state eligible to par- 
ticipate in the grant in-aid [sic] provisions of the Federal Act. 
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contained nonjeopardy language virtually identical to the 16 U.S.C. 
4 1536(c) nonjeopardy language of the 1973 FESA. 
The Governor shall review other programs administered by him and utilize 
such programs in furtherance of the purposes of the act. All other state de- 
partments and agencies shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of 
the [Nebraska Game and Parks] commission, utilize their authorities in fur- 
therance of the purposes of this act by carrying out programs for the conserva- 
tion of endangered species and threatened species listed pursuant to section 5 
of this act, and by taking such actton necessary to insure that actions authm- 
ized, funded, or carried out by than do not jeopardize the continued existence 
of such endungered species or result i n  the htruction or modfication of 
habitat of such species which is determined by the commission to be 
critical.238 
Compare the italicized language with the corresponding language of 
section 7 of the 1973 FESA: 
and by taking such action necessary to insure that actions authorized, funded, 
or carried out by such agency is not likely to jeopardize the continued &t- 
ence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in  the destruc- 
tion or advme modQ?.cafion of habitat of such species which is determined by 
the Secretary, after consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be 
critid.239 
Both provisions require state and federal agencies, respectively, to in- 
sure that agency action does not jeopardize endangered species or 
their critical habitat. The only significant difference between the two 
is that section 37-435(3) is absolute in its nonjeopardy requirement. 
Section 37-435(3) requires state agencies to take such action as to in- 
sure that agency actions do not jeopardize endangered species or their 
critical habitat, a n  absolute prohibition. Section 1536(c), in contrast, 
only requires that federal agencies take action to insure that their 
agency actions "are not likely" to jeopardize endangered species or 
their critical habitat. Thus Nebraska state agencies are under a 
greater requirement to avoid jeopardizing endangered species or their 
habitat than are federal agencies.aO 
LB 145 was debated prior to the 1978 Tellico and Grayrocks deci- 
sions. Thus the legislative debate completely missed the important 
point that the nonjeopardy provisions could interfere with state-au- 
thorized construction projects, particularly water projects.241 The leg- 
LB 145 Statement of Intent, Committee on Constitutional Revision & Recreation 
Interim Study Committee, 84th Leg., Ist Sess. (Jan. 21,1975) (copy available from 
author upon request). 
238. LB 145, § 6(3) (1975) (emphasis added). The language of the bill as introduced 
was not modified when enacted and is currently codified at NEB. REV. STAT. 9 37- 
435(3) (1984). 
239. 16 U.S.C. 5 1535(c) (1973) (emphasis added) (amended 1978). 
240. While $1535(c) was amended in 1978, the agency duty to insure no jeopardy was 
not changed, although the possibility of obtaining an exemption was created. 
241. LB 145 Floor Debate at 602-03, 84th Leg., lst Sess. (1975) (statement of Senator 
Kime). Id at 613-14,617. Another issue that generated some debate was whether 
LB 145 authorized the Game and Parks Commission to condemn private property 
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islative debate focused instead on whether a new state program could 
be financially justified,242 and whether endangered species conserva- 
tion would better be assumed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
rather than by the Game and Parks Commi8sion.243 It would not be 
until the national snail darter controversy and the Grayrocks decision 
that Nebraska water developers would realize the threat that NESA 
posed to their pending water projects. Little Blue II would raise 
NESA in the water project context for the first time, and create the 
legal and political impasse that resulted in LB 1106. 
H. Federal and State Water Project Funding 
As noted earlier, federal water project funding through the recla- 
mation program has driven western surface water development. While 
state law provides the framework within which appropriations are ac- 
quired and administered, federal programs provide the funding that 
makes water project development possible. Thus, while state law au- 
thorizes formation of reclamation districts and the grant and adminis- 
tration of appropriations, the key to successful water project 
development is federal funding.244 
The Carter Hit List. One of the most controversial water policy 
developments in recent times was President Carter's controversial 
water project hit list.245 However, the Carter list was controversial 
for endangered species conservation purposes without express legislative a p  
proval. Id at 613-14, 617. 
242. The only reference to the jeopardy was an unexplained reference to state agency 
cooperation in testimony presented by the Nebraska Game and Parks Commis- 
sion, the agency that would administer LB 145. LB 145 Hearing, supra note 236 at 
11 (statement of Bill Bailey, Neb. Game & Parks Comm'n). 
243. The issue was whether the Game and Parks Commission was so dominated by 
hunting interests that it would not properly administer a program dealing with 
non-game wildlife species. Id at 18 (statement of Dorothy Wheeler). This was 
probably the result of Commission support of an unsuccessful bill to establish a 
hunting season for the mourning dove. Id at 17. The bill was very controversial. 
Id at 23 (statement of Bob Wick, Grand Island Audubon Soc'y). However, a r e p  
resentative of the Nebraska Sierra Club expressed confidence in the Game and 
Parks Commission to even-handedly administer LB 145. Id at 19 (statement of 
Tim Hergenrader). 
244. The High Plains Study illustrates the importance of federal funding to water pro- 
ject development. See Cround Water Mining, supra note 206, at 52226. Because 
the study ultimately recommended against developing a rescue project importing 
Missouri River water to the High Plains region of Nebraska, Colorado, Kansas, 
Oklahoma, New Mexico and Texas because of excessive project costs, the hopes 
of that gigantic water diversion have been dashed, at  least temporarily. A second 
illustration is Arizona's adoption of relatively effective ground water regulations 
to obtain continued federal support for the massive Central Arizona Project. Re- 
garding the CAP, see id at 521. Regarding the federal role in adopting the 
ground water code, see Kyle, supra note 234, at 502. 
245. The hit list was so named because President Carter proposed deleting from the 
1978 federal budget funding for 19 water projects that had been previously au- 
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not only because it proposed to deauthorize for the first time water 
projects previously authorized by Congress. Perhaps more signifi- 
cantly, the hit list's accompanying water policy initiatives also pro- 
posed to modify federal water project funding policies and to require 
substantive reforms of state water laws if states wished to qualify for 
federal water project funding. To better understand the Carter water 
policy initiatives we must first review the interaction between state 
water development and appropriation policies and federal water pro- 
ject funding policies. 
As discussed earlier, development of a water project is a process 
that involves both state and federal laws. First, local project sponsors, 
if they believe that they may eventually qualify for federal water pro- 
ject funding, will establish the local district (reclamation district, irri- 
gation district, etc.) to serve as the local project sponsor. This 
typically involves holding an election to establish the district.246 The 
next step is then to develop preliminary project plans, often referred 
to as prefeasibility studies, upon which to base an appropriation appli- 
cation for the project. The prefeasibility studies may be undertaken 
with or without federal assistance. If the district obtains the state ap- 
propriation, it then can qualify for federal project planning assist- 
ance.247 If the federal agency, typically the Bureau of Reclamation, 
determines that the proposed project meets feasibility standards, it 
will recommend that the project be authorized by Congress and that 
project planning and construction funds be appropriated.248 The time 
period from initial district organization to project construction may be 
twenty to thirty years.249 
As described earlier, this process, complicated enough, has been 
further complicated by federal environmentaf. laws (notably NEPA, 
section 404 of the Clean Water Act, and FESA), which require that 
environmental impacts of proposed federal actions be identified, and 
that certain environmental effects be avoided. These project chal- 
lenges are typically made after the project has been authorized by 
Congress, when project planning and development is fairly advanced 
thorized by Congress but which had not yet been completed. President Carter 
proposed to deauthorize those projects. Scheele, President Carter and the Water 
Prqiecb: A Case Sfudy in Presidentid and Congressional Decision-Making, 8 
PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY 348 (1978). Interestingly the 19 projects r e p  
resented only a small proportion of the 342 projects then authorized. Id at 352. 
246. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47. 
247. The district must hold a state appropriation for the proposed project to qualify for 
federal planning assistance. The water right, even though it is not perfected, is 
mandatory to obtain federal project assistance. Regarding appropriation perfec- 
tion, see R. m S B E R G E R  & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at 8486. See ako supra 
note 39. 
248. Sax, supra note 50, at 138-40. Regarding the test for project feasibility, see id at 
141-47. 
249. See WATER POLICIES FOR THE F ~ T J R E ,  supra note 40, at 393-94. 
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and completion becomes more likely. If the project state has enacted 
similar environmental statutes, challenges to the proje-ct may be made 
at an earlier stage in the development process when the district ap- 
plies for its project water appropriation. 
The Carter hit list did not propose to alter significantly this pro- 
cess, but merely to deauthorize 19 of the over 300 water projects then 
authorized, However, the water policy initiatives proposed in Carter's 
1977 environmental address proposed going beyond mere project 
deauthorization. Drawing heavily from the water policy reforms pro- 
posed by the NWC, the Carter water policy initiatives would have im- 
posed cost-sharing requirements on project water users. The policies 
would have required states to make substantive changes in their water 
laws to qualify for federal project cost sharing assistance. These water 
law changes included recognition of instream values, ground water 
management requirements to prevent or control ground water deple- 
tion, and efficient use requirements to reduce irrigation water 
demands.250 
The Carter water policy initiatives aroused a storm of protest in 
western governors' mansions and in Congress. The governors accused 
the Carter administration of being ignorant of western water needs.251 
Congress resented the intrusion in what it considered a useful and im- 
portant political prerogative, as water projects for a home district usu- 
ally can be translated into votes.252 In the end, however, Carter was 
able to make most of his project deauthorizations stick, and the 1977 
water resources bill was the last one enacted to date.253 Even though 
Carter's water policy initiatives were not implemented by Congress 
during his term, elements of them will undoubtledly be included in 
the ultimate federal cost sharing programs, if water developers can 
obtain any federal assistance at all. 
The Reagan administration proved to be no more a friend to water 
development than its predecessor. Reagan abolished the regional 
river basin commissions254 and has been willing to try to balance the 
budget at the expense of new water projects. Only recently has a fed- 
eral water resources bill, the Water Resources Development Act of 
1986, been enacted.255 The Act establishes new cost sharing require- 
250. See ia at 230-43, 247-52, 256-59, 271-79. See also Hillhouse & Hannay, Pnrctical 
Implications of the New National Wafer Policy, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 22- 
1 (1979). 
251. Matheson, President Carter's Wafer Policy: Partnership or Preemption? 25 
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1-1 (1979) (the author is the Governor of Utah); 
Scheele, supra note 245, at 353 n.24. 
252. Scheele, supra note 245, at 353 n.24. 
253. While existing projects have been provided continuing funding in annual federal 
appropriation bills, no new projects have been authorized since 1977. 
254. B. ANDREWS & M. SANSONE, supra note 39, at 221-22. 
255. Water Resources Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662. 
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ments for Corps of Engineers projects: 35% local cost sharing for flood 
control, 100% for hydropower generation, 100% for municipal and in- 
dustrial water supply, 35% for irrigation water supply, and 50% for 
recreation benefits36 The Act does not specify what local interests 
would be responsible for providing the local cost share. Thus the local 
interests could include the state, the region in which the project would 
be constructed, the local water users directly benefiting from the pro- 
ject, or some combination of these interests. Significantly, the Act 
does not establish cost sharing requirements for reclamation 
projects.257 
The stalemate over federal funding for reclamation projects stem- 
ming from the Carter hit list has yet to be resolved. However, given 
the current concern with balancing the federal budget, it seems clear 
that any new reclamation projects constructed in the future will re- 
quire significant state and/or local cost sharing to qualify for federal 
funding, if federal funding is available at all. The golden era of recla- 
mation has ended, and the water policy future identified by the Na- 
tional Water Commission has begun. 
IV. L l r n  BLUE 
By 1980 the water development picture in Nebraska had become 
uncertain. Intensive ground water use for irrigation had led to wide- 
spread ground water level declines, creating a demand for rescue 
projects. Traditional federal reclamation policies had lulled ground 
water users into a false sense of security that ground water depletion 
would be offset through project development. This expectation was 
reflected in state "local option" ground water policies of no regulation, 
which were based on the hope that supplemental water supply devel- 
opment would forestall the need for meaningful ground water regula- 
tions. However, the hope that rescue projects could be developed was 
becoming less realistic: federal environmental policies had by this 
time slowed the Norden project on the Niobrara river, and the snail 
darter and Grayrocks cases suggested that reclamation projects them- 
selves would become endangered if they jeopardized endangered spe- 
cies or their habitat. The Grayrocks litigation had resulted in creating 
the Platte River Whooping Crane Trust, which was viewed by devel- 
opers as a standing guarantee that environmental interests would get 
their day in court if the Platte were developed. The Carter water pro- 
ject hit list sent shock waves throughout the water development com- 
munity, raising the frightening specter that the days of federal 
256. Id 4 103(c). 
257. Many observers expect the 35% irrigation cost share for Corps projects to be ex- 
tended to the Bureau of Reclamation a s  well. 
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subsidies were over and that states or (worse yet) irrigators would be 
required to provide significant funding for reclamation projects. 
But more water policy controversy was to surface. The judicial re- 
versal of a longstanding prohibition against interbasin surface water 
transfers led to the current Platte River water wars, pitting developer 
against developer in a legal battle that would do more arid states 
proud. The Little Blue cases would create the policy impasse en- 
gendering the Water Independence Congress and LB 1106. 
A. Little Blue I 
While ground water irrigation development increased the potential 
demands on the Platte for supplemental irrigation water, and federal 
environmental policy changes were making water project implemen- 
tation more difficult, the Platte valley was still quiet, at least on the 
surface. Irrigation interests in the Blue and Republican River basins, 
who lacked the surface water resources to augment declining ground 
water supplies, felt stymied by the 1936 Osterman decision prohibiting 
interbasin transfers of streamflow.25s Attempts to overrule Osterman 
through legislation had failed, resulting in stormy, divisive legislative 
debates.259 Platte River interests were secure in the feeling that there 
was sufficient streamflow available to support their needs. 
This calm was shattered by the first salvo in the present Platte 
River wars, the 1980 decision of Little Blue Natural Resources Dist. v. 
Lower Platte North Natural Resources Dist. (Little Blue 1).260 Little 
Blue proposed to divert water coming from the Tri-County irrigation 
system to irrigate land in the Blue River basin originally proposed to 
be part of the Tri-County project but eliminated by Osterman. The 
DWR found that there was sufficient unappropriated water available 
for the irrigation project, but concluded that Osterman legally pre- 
vented the DWR from granting the appropriation.261 Little Blue ap- 
pealed the decision of the department, and the Nebraska Supreme 
Court overruled O s t m a n  in a unanimous decision.262 The court 
258. Regarding Osterman, see R. WSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at 355- 
57. Regarding interbasin transfers, see id at 353-54. 
259. See Interbasin Tramfers, supra note 63, at 98-103. 
260. 206 Neb. 535, 294 N.W.2d 598 (1980); see also Pearson, ConstitutionaZ Restmints 
on Water Development in  Nebraska, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 695 (1983); Note, 
Water Law-Transbasin Diversion i n  Nebraska, 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 887 
(1981). 
261. Applications 15146 and 15148 of the Little Blue Natural Resources District; Order 
of Denial (June 25, 1979) (Neb. Dep't of Water Resources) (copy available from 
author upon request). The DWR relied on an attorney general's opinion conclud- 
ing that O s t m a n  precluded granting the application. Letter from Paul L. Doug- 
las, Nebraska Attorney General, to John W. Neuberger, Director of Water 
Resources (June 21,1979) (copy available from author upon request). 
262. Little Blue Natural Resources Dist. v. Lower Platte North Natural Resources 
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ruled that the constitutional dedication of water to the people of the 
state did not dedicate that use to a particular river basin.263 The court 
also interpreted section 46-205 to authorize interbasin transfers if the 
water diverted would be returned to the river of origin or to the Mis- 
souri.264 This also overruled that portion of the O s t m a n  decision 
which had interpreted the IEssouri River basin proviso of section 46- 
205 as having no meaning. The court ruled, however, that section 46- 
235 required the DWR director to determine whether the Little Blue 
appropriation was in the public interest before deciding whether to 
issue the permit. As the director had not done so, the court remanded 
the order back to the DWR to make the requisite findings.265 The 
court did not discuss what should be taken into consideration in deter- 
mining the public interest. 
Little Blue I triggered a rush for Platte River water. Out-of-basin 
interests went to work to develop project proposals for which they 
could file appropriation applications. Those Platte River interests that 
had not yet filed their appropriation applications for their Platte 
projects rushed to do so, in order to file before any out-of-basin inter- 
ests filed.266 The previous calm was gone forever; now Platte River 
water was up for grabs and every water developer wanted its share. 
Developers also recognized that there was not enough water to meet 
all project needs. They girded themselves to do battle with other pro- 
ject sponsors to see whose application would survive for possible im- 
plementation. Those with later filing dates had even more incentive to 
derail opposing applications; unless they could do so their appropria- 
tion would be worthless as there would be insufficient unappropriated 
water available for diversion and storage after senior rights were 
served. 
B. Little Blue 11 
After Little Blue I, the DWR subsequently determined that the 
Little Blue project was in the public interest.267 That decision was 
immediately appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court. Before the 
Dist., 206 Neb. 535,294 N.W.2d 598 (1980) [Litfk Blue I]. For a discussion of Little 
Blue I, see R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at  362-64. The irriga- 
tion defendants in Little Blue I far outnumbered the environmental defendants, 
indicating that the real controversy with Platte River water projects is not simply 
an environmentalist versus developer conflict but a project versus project con- 
flict. Id a t  362. 
263. 206 Neb. 535, 543,294 N.W.2d 598,602 (1980). 
264. Id at 546,294 N.W.2d at 603. 
265. Id at 548,294 N.W.2d at 604. 
266. See PLAITE PROJEC~S SUMMARY, supra note 226. 
267. Applications 15146 and 15148 of the Little Blue Natural Resources District; Order 
of Approval (Dec. 29,1980) (Neb. Dept. of Water Resources) (copy available from 
author upon request). See R. HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at 366. 
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court could issue its Little Blue 11 opinion, however, legislation was 
enacted defining public interest considerations for interbasin transfer 
appropriation applications.268 Interbasin transfer appropriations can 
be granted, after considering the economic and environmental costs 
and benefits of the proposed appropriation and water supply alterna- 
tives, if the benefits to the state of granting the application outweigh 
the benefits to the state of denying the appropriation.269 Unfortu- 
nately the Nebraska Supreme Court did not have the opportunity to 
interpret these provisions in Little Blue II. Instead, the court ruled 
that the application should be remanded for further proceedings 
under NESA.270 As noted above, the act requires state agencies to 
consult with the Game and Parks Commission to determine whether 
the proposed agency action would interfere with the continued exist- 
ence of threatened or endangered species or their critical habitat.271 
NESA also prohibits state agencies from taking actions that would 
jeopardize the continued existence of threatened or endangered spe- 
cies or their critical habitat. The DWR had not consulted with the 
Commission regarding possible effects of the Little Blue project on 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
268. Act approved May 22,1981,1981 Neb. Laws, LB 252 $5 5,6 (codified at NEB. REV. 
STAT. $9 46-288 to -289 (1984 & 1986 Cum. Supp.)). See R. WSBERGER & N. 
%ORSON, supra note 7, at  364-66. 
269. The specific criteria required to be considered in making this public interest de- 
termination are: (1) the economic, environmental, and other benefits of the pro- 
posed interbasin transfer and use; (2) any adverse impacts of the proposed 
interbasin transfer and use; (3) the current and reasonably foreseeable beneficial 
uses of water in the basin of origin; (4) the economic, environmental and other 
benefits of leaving the water in the basin of origin for current or future beneficial 
uses; (5) alternative sources of water available to the applicant; and (6) alterna- 
tive sources of water available to the basin of origin for future beneficial uses. 
NEB. REV. STAT. $46-289 (1984 & 1986 Cum. Supp.). Beneficial uses are defined 
to include but not to be limited to the reasonable and efficient use of water for 
domestic, municipal, agricultural, industrial, commercial, power production, sub- 
irrigation, fish and wildlife, ground water recharge, interstate compact require- 
ments, water quality maintenance, or recreational purposes. Id at § 46-288. The 
public interest criteria were modified in 1986. Act approved April 18,1986, 1986 
Neb. Laws, LB 309 3 2 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. 46-289 (Cum. Supp. 1986)). 
Now $46-289 authorizes the DWR to grant an interbasin transfer appropriation 
application if the benefits to the receiving basin and the state equal or exceed the 
adverse impacts of the transfer to the state and the transferring basin. These 
provisions are ambiguous regarding whether the benefits of the receiving basin 
should be counted in the state benefits, i.e., whether the receiving basin benefits 
(and the transferring basin adverse impacts) will be counted twice. See Aiken, 
Nebraska Water Law Update No. 78 5-6 (Feb. 11,1986) (Univ. of Neb. Dep't of Ag. 
Econ.) (copy available from author upon request). Presumably this change is in- 
tended to make it easier to obtain appropriation permits for interbasin transfers. 
270. Little Blue Natural Resources Dist. v. Lower Platte North Natural Resources 
Dist., 210 Neb. 862, 871-72, 317 N.W.2d 726, 732 (1982) (Little Blue 11). See R. 
HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at  366-70. 
271. NEB. REV. STAT. 5 37-435(3) (1984). See supra notes 238-239 and accompanying 
text. 
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endangered species, and it therefore was not authorized to issue the 
appropriation. 
Little Blue 11 provided even more of a shock to project developers 
than its predecessor. Most developers had come to oppose the prohibi- 
tion of interbasin transfers,272 and thus were not disappointed with 
Little Blue I (Platte basin project sponsors excepted of course). Little 
Blue II was something entirely different. While project sponsors had 
reluctantly realized that environmental considerations would come 
into play when dealing with federal permits and funds for water 
projects, environmental constraints had not intruded into state pro- 
ceedings. No doubt sponsors expected that they would be able to ob- 
tain an endangered species exemption should a water project violate 
federal jeopardy requirements. At least such considerations were de- 
cades away. Little Blue II changed the environmental complacency of 
water developers: now they would have to contend with endangered 
species protection in state appropriation proceedings. Although it was 
not clear how the Game and Parks Commission would interpret the 
NESA jeopardy requirements, developers were aware that the critical 
whooping crane habitat had been designated in the central Platte re- 
gion.273 The critical habit was, in turn, under the watchful eye of the 
whooping crane trust. It was no longer business as usual when project 
sponsors were applying for appropriations from a basically sympa- 
thetic DWR. Water development in Nebraska had finally been thrust 
into the modern world. 
Based on the Little Blue I1 decision the Little Blue NRD formally 
consulted with the Game and Parks Commission to determine the im- 
pact of its project on endangered species or their critical habitat. The 
Commission issued a biological opinion that unless the project were 
substantially modified (and it could be inferred that such modifica- 
tions were feasible) substantial interference with the critical habitat of 
several endangered species would occur.274 The jeopardy opinion by 
the Commission confirmed the worst fears of project sponsors and 
brought water development in Nebraska to a standstill. 
272. See R. WNSBERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 7, at  353. 
273. See supra note 148. 
274. NEBWKA Gmm & PARKS C O ~ ~ S S I O N ,  BIOLOGICAL OPINION, LITTLE BLUE - 
CATHERLAND PROJECT (1985). The Commission concluded that "the Little Blue- 
Catherland project will jeopardize the continued existence of the whooping 
crane, bald eagle, and the least tern. . . . To the best of our knowledge, there are 
no reasonable or prudent alternatives that would avoid jeopardy should the Little 
Blue-Catherland project with or without Prairie Bend be constructed and oper- 
ated as currently proposed." Id at 6. The opinion did suggest that modifying 
project operation and/or providing substitute water to compensate for diversions 
could be used to avoid jeopardy. Id at 7-8. 
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A. The Water Independence Congress 
The Game and Parks Commission biological opinion was the coup 
de grace that halted Nebraska surface water development at least tem- 
porarily. The reasons for this stalemate included: (1) disagreements 
about allocation of surface water between instream environmental 
uses and out of stream uses (as reflected in the endangered species and 
NEPA litigation), and a realization (in some quarters) that a mecha- 
nism was needed to resolve such conflicts other than through litiga- 
tion;275 (2) the belief that additional surface water development was 
feasible and desirable, particularly to provide supplemental water to 
irrigators depleting local ground water supplies; and (3) the realiza- 
tion that state (or local) water project funding was required to com- 
pensate for reduced federal financial assistance. These concerns led 
Governor Kerrey to establish his Water Independence Congress on 
May 26,1983, to develop water policy recommendations for legislative 
and gubernatorial consideration.276 
The Congress submitted its final report to Governor Kerrey on De- 
cember 7, 1983.277 Congressional recommendations included (1) le- 
gally recognizing instream flows for fish, wildlife and ground water 
recharge; (2) requiring natural resource districts to prepare ground 
water management plans; (3) pursuing additional surface water im- 
poundment; (4) amending the Nebraska Constitution to authorize 
state general obligation bonds for impoundment projects; (5) authoriz- 
ing state financial assistance for impoundments only when public and 
private benefits exceed project costs; (6) requiring project benefi- 
ciaries to pay their share of project costs based on the benefits re- 
ceived;278 (7) establishing a Natural Resources director to replace the 
- - - - - - - - 
275. Most irrigation interests persist in denying environmental instream water uses 
any real legitimacy. This development bias will probably persist for some time. 
It is unlikely that environmental interests would receive any legal protection in 
Nebraska in the absence of federal environmental safeguards or judicial adoption 
of the public trust doctrine. Regarding the latter, see R. HARNSBERGER & N. 
THORSON, supra note 7, at 296-320. 
276. Aiken, Nebraska Water Law Update No. 60 2-7 (Oct. 14,1983) (Univ. of Neb. Ag. 
Econ. Dep't) (copy available from author upon request). The author was a mem- 
ber of the Water Congress. 
277. NEBRASKA WATER INDEPENDENCE ONGRESS, FINAL REPORT (Dec. 7,1983). The 
author filed a dissenting opinion, and joined a dissenting opinion prepared by 
Creighton University Law Professor Eric Pearson. Letter from J. David Aiken to 
Governor Bob Kerrey (Dec. 14,1983); Dissenting remarks of J. David hiken and 
Eric Pearson, members, Nebraska Water Independence Congress, Dec. 7, 1983 
(copy available from author upon request). The author's dissent emphasized that 
the Water Congress had avoided coming to grips with the reality of ground water 
depletion and the limited effect of rescue projects to significantly affect depletion 
rates statewide. 
278. Most Water Congress members did not realize that in the absence of federal pro- 
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Executive Director of the Natural Resources Commission; and (8) es- 
tablishing a Water Management Board to review and approve pro- 
posed major impoundments, as well as providing an administrative 
forum for project conflict resolution. The recommendations of the 
Congress represented a major victory for the Governor, who sought 
increased political control over the Nebraska Natural Resources Com- 
mission. In total, however, the recommendations largely sought to 
maintain the status quo of seeking rescue projects at primarily federal 
expense to maintain ground water-based irrigation. The instream 
flow recommendation was only a gesture and did not reflect a political 
consensus that environmental values were legitimate water policy 
concerns.279 
B. The Governor's Bill 
Based on the Congress's recommendations, Senator Loren Schmit 
introduced LB 1106 for Governor Kerrey in the 1984 legislative ses- 
sion. The original bill established a Water Management Board with 
broad water project review authorities, established a director of Natu- 
ral Resources to replace the Natural Resources Comminsion (NRC) 
executive secretary, established a water management fund to provide 
state funding for major water projects, authorized the NRC to obtain 
instream appropriations, and required NRDs to prepare ground water 
management plans. Portions of the Governor's bill were very contro- 
versial, leading to significant committee amendments and a second 
hearing. Each major portion of LB 1106 represented a significant 
water policy change. 
The first major change proposed by the Governor's bill was estab- 
lishment of the Water Management Board (WMB). The purpose of 
establishing the WMB was to help resolve conflicts over water projects 
ject cost sharing this recommendation would preclude irrigation projects in the 
absence of sustained high crop prices, as irrigators typically can afford to pay only 
a fraction of the cost of water from reclamation projects. See supra note 202. 
However most Congress members assumed that federal water project subsidies 
would be available, and that the state's share of project costs would not exceed 
35%. 
279. The instream flow recommendations were controversial and limited. The author 
recalls a stormy meeting where he presented specific alternatives for granting 
instream appropriations that had been prepared at  the request of Congress Co- 
Chairman John Cavanaugh. These proposals met violent opposition from agri- 
cultural interests on the Congress, who stated rather forcefully that they were in 
favor of going on record as supporting instream flows but would not favor going 
the next step of actually allowing water to be legally allocated to instream flows. 
The actual position was that instream flows were acceptable as long as the water 
was not needed for agriculture, at which point agriculture would be entitled to all 
the water it needed. This philosophy is reflected in the take-away provision of 
the instrearn flow portions of LB 1106. See infra text accompanying notes 326-28. 
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so development could occur.280 WMB authorities were not as contro- 
versial as other features of the Governor's bill, and were not signlfi- 
cantly changed as LB 1106 was enacted.281 The WMB would have 
included the Game and Parks director, the newly created director of 
Natural Resources and one gubernatorial appointee with demon- 
strated natural resources experience.282 The WMB would have major 
water project review responsibilities, including determining whether a 
proposed project was consistent with NRC state water use goals; de- 
termining whether a proposed project was technically, environmen- 
tally, financially and economically feasible; attempting to resolve 
project conflicts including the authority to modify project design and 
operation; and determining whether a project was in the state's inter- 
est.283 The WMB would also consult and make endangered species 
determinations with Game and Parks for projects reviewed by the 
WMB.284 Any project sponsor seeking state project planning assist- 
280. 
It is the intent of the Legislature that an organizational structure be es- 
tablished within state government to identify, propose, support, advo- 
cate, resolve conflicts regarding, and expedite water development 
projects in the state in the most efficient manner possible. The Legisla- 
ture further intends that the Water Management Board be the entity for 
such purposes. 
LB 1106 $1, 88th Leg. 2nd Sess. (1984) (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. $215.10'7 
(Cum. Supp. 1986)) [hereinafter Governor's Bill]. 
281. Creation of the WMB was opposed, however, by the Nebraska Association of Re- 
sources Districts, composed of state Natural Resource Districts. Hearings on LB 
1106 Before the Committee on Public Works 31 (1984) (statement of Gordon Kis- 
sel) bereinafter Governot-5 Bill Hearing]. The WMB was also opposed by the 
Natural Resource Commission, the Nebraska Farm Bureau Federation and three 
NRDs. Id. at  40, 41 (statement of Clinton VonSeggren, Neb. Natural Resources 
Comm'n), 56 (statement of Bruce Neidig, Neb. Farm Bureau Federation), 64 
(statement of Steve Oltmans, Lower Elkhorn NRD), 66 (statement of Paul Mann, 
Upper Elkhorn NRD), 72 (statement of Me1 Sahs, Lower Platte North NRD). 
282. Governor's Bill, supra note 280, $2, at 1, 2 (codified as amended at NEB. REV. 
STAT. 5 2-15.108 (Cum. Supp. 1986)). 
283. Id. $ 4, at  4 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. 9 2-15,110 (Cum. Supp. 1986)). 
284. Id. $ 5, at  4 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. 5 2-15,111 (Cum. Supp. 1986)). See also id 
$21, at 22,23 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. 9 37-435(2) (1984 Cum.Supp.)). Section 
5 of the Governor's Bill was intended to clarify an ambiguity created in Little 
Blue Natural Resources Dist. v. Lower Platte North Natural Resources Dist., 210 
Neb. 862,317 N.W.2d 726 (1982). In that case the Supreme Court ruled that state 
agencies were required to consult with the Game and Parks Commission under 
NEB. REV. STAT.$ 37-435(3) (Cum. Supp. 1984) and that NRDs were state agen- 
cies. This ruling is clearly wrong: NRDs are political subdivisions, not state agen- 
cies. The issue addressed by 3 5, however, was that multiple Game and Parks 
endangered species consultations would have been present in any event and the 
Liffle Blue ruling only increased the number of formal consultations involved. 
Section 5 attempts to resolve this by having the WMB engage in a single endan- 
gered species consultation for a project, and by not requiring an additional consul- 
tation when the DWR rules on a project's application. However, this presumes 
that the WMB will determine the final form of the project, which is not necessar- 
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ance, state financial support, state advocacy assistance, or for an ap- 
propriation exceeding either 10,000 acre feet per year or ten cubic feet 
per second285 of natural flow would be required to submit their project 
to the WMB.286 Project sponsors with appropriation applications al- 
ready filed with the DWR would be authorized but not required to file 
with the WIMB.287 If the determinations made by the WMB were 
favorable, and Game and Parks endangered species consultation was 
successful, the WMB would be authorized to support and financially 
participate in the proposed project.288 If the proposed project were 
not economically feasible, but otherwise met project approval require- 
ments, the WMB could not oppose water rights being obtained for the 
proposed project.289 If the WMB determined that the project did not 
meet approval requirements, the WMB would be required to oppose 
any appropriation even if the project were economically feasible.290 
The DWR director would be authorized, but not required, to refer ap- 
propriation applications to the WMB for its evaluation.29l 
The project approval authorities of the WMB, which were enacted 
without substantial change, were substantial. Because state political 
support is indispensable to obtain federal project funding, WMB ap- 
proval carries substantial weight.292 Moreover, the WMB was given 
broad authorities to force a compromise on project sponsors and oppo- 
ily the case. See i?tfru text accompanying notes 335-39. Thus multiple comdta- 
tiom on a project may be justified where the project, and especially its 
endangered species effects, have been modified. As the endangered species ef- 
fects are likely to be among the most controversial features of any Platte River 
water project, project modification to avoid jeopardy seems likely. 
One cubic foot of water equals 7.48 gallons. One cubic foot per second (cfs) equals 
448.8 gallons of water per minute. HARN~BERGER & THORSON, supra note 7, at 7-8. 
Governor's Bill, supra note 280, $8, at  5, (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. 
8 2-15,114(1) (Cum. Supp. 1986)). 
Id 8 8, at  5 (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. 2-15,114(2) (Cum. Supp. 
1986)). 
Id 9 10(2), at 6 (codified a t  NEB. REV. STAT. 2-15,116(2) (Cum. Supp. 1986)). 
Id. $10(3), at  6 (codified as amended a t  NEB. REV. STAT. 2-15,116(2) (1986 
Cum.Supp.)). 
Id 5 10(4), at  6 (codified a t  NEB. REV. STAT. 2-15,116(2) (Cum. Supp. 1986)). 
Id 5 35, at 30, 31 (codified at  NEB. REV, STAT. $46-209 (1984)). 
A good illustration is the Norden project on the Niobrara River. The original 
Bureau of Reclamation project was delayed through litigation. See supra text 
accompanying notes 97-101. Subsequently project opponents were able to con- 
vince Congressman Cavanaugh and later Congressman Bereuter to withdraw 
support for the project. Ultimately supporters were able to obtain a political re- 
evaluation of the project including consideration of an irrigation water supply 
project that would not dam the Niobrara river. NEB. DEP'T OF WATER RE- 
SOURCES, NEBRASKA STATE-LED O'NEILL UNIT ALTERNATIVES TUDY (1985). 
While the fate of the Norden project is unclear, it is likely that if any irrigation 
supply project is implemented it will be the alternative plan rather than the origi- 
nal Norden dam. Given the uncertainty regarding federal and state project fund- 
ing, the lack of political unanimity means that even a substitute may never be 
implemented. See supra note 86. 
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nents. As Governor Kerrey noted in his testimony, LB 1106 was in- 
tended to get water projects proposals moving towards completion 
rather than being tied up in environmental and water rights litiga- 
tion.293 Moreover, as Congress Co-Chairman John Cavanaugh noted, 
the WMB was intended to sort through all project proposals, and to 
recommend project funding priorities to the Unicameral.294 However, 
the projects currently involved in the Platte Rriver war have already 
filed their appropriations applications and would be beyond the 
WMB's review.295 Thus, the DWR would continue to be the battle- 
ground for Platte River projects unless either the DWR referred the 
applications to the WMB, or the Governor insisted that WMB ap- 
proval be obtained before the state provide any tangible assistance to 
water project sponsors. Neither has proved to be the case. 
The second major innovation proposed in the Governor's bill was 
the establishment of the Director of Natural Resources (DNR). Under 
existing law the NRC, the water planning agency for the state and 
focal point for water development promotion, was headed by an exec- 
utive secretary appointed by it.296 As the NRC is dominated by river 
basin representatives elected by local rJRDs,297 the executive director 
was perceived as being politically accountable to the NRDs. As NRD 
directors are elected by subdistrict rather than on the basis of popula- 
tion,298 NRDs and the NRC have a pro-development philosophy. LEl 
1106 proposed to eliminate the NRC executive secretary position and 
create the DNR as a gubernatorial appointee subject to confirmation 
by two-thirds of the NRC.299 The DNR also could be removed by a 
two-thirds NRC vote.300 
This proposal was very controversial, as it essentially shifted NRC 
control from NRDs to the Governor. Proponents of the DNR argued 
that for the Governor to support increased appropriations for water 
development and to be able to take the political heat for those in- 
creased appropriations, the Governor needed greater political control 
over the water development process.301 Opponents charged that gu- 
bernatorial appointment of the DNR would politicize water develop- 
293. Governor's BiZZ Hearing, supra note 281, a t  2 (statement of Gov. Bob Kerrey). 
294. Id at 17 (statement of John Cavanaugh). Mr. Cavanaugh was the Governor's 
representative on, and Co-Chairman of, the Water Congress. 
295. See Platte Prqiects Summary, supra, note 226. 
296. There were no statutory references to the administrative head of the NRC. H o w -  
ever, the NRC has general authority to hire employees. NEB. REV. STAT. $2-1506 
(1983). 
297. Id at $21504, 
298. See supra note 233. 
299. Governor's Bill, supra note 280, 4 12, at  8, 9 (codified as amended at NEB. REV. 
STAT. $ 2-1504.03 (Cum. Supp. 1986)). 
300. Id 
301. Governor's Bill Hearing, supra note 281, at 7 (statement of Gov. Bob Kerrey), 15- 
17 (statement of John Cavanaugh, Water Congress Co-Chairman). 
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ment and weaken local control over water development policies.302 
Gubernatorial appointment of the DNR was one issue that was signifi- 
cantly modified by committee amendment. 
The third major feature of LB 1106 was the Water Management 
Fund, from which the WMB could provide cost sharing for up to 75% 
of a water project's cost.303 Section 16 further limited NRC grants 
from the existing Resources Development Fund to $10 million dollars, 
limiting NRDF grants to smaller projects and giving the WMB (rather 
than the NRC) control over state cost sharing for major irrigation 
projects.304 LB 1106 contained no source of funding for the Water 
Management Fund, however, suggesting that appropriations would be 
made for specific projects on a case by case basis as recommended by 
the W . 3 0 5  
The fourth major feature of LB 1106 was authorization of instream 
appropriations. Nebraska had not yet adopted instream flow legisla- 
tion,306 and the issue is still controversial. The LB 1106 approach to 
instream flows can only be described as cautious. Under the Gover- 
nor's bill, instream appropriations could be obtained from the DWR by 
the NRC for fish and wildlife purposes only.307 NRDs and the Game 
and Parks Commission would nominate stream segments to the NRC 
which had "critical needs" for instream flow protection.308 After a 
public hearing, the NRC would file an appropriation application with 
the DWR to reserve a priority date.309 The NRC then would study the 
proposed instream appropriation to identify whether it could be sup- 
plied solely from unappropriated natural flow, from existing reser- 
voirs or from new reservoirs.3lo After the study, the NRC would 
request that the DWR proceed with the instream appropriation appli- 
cation only if the NRC determined that sufficient unappropriated nat- 
302. Id at 31 (statement of Gordon Kissel, Neb. Ass'n of Resources Districts), 36 
(statement of Clinton VonSeggren, Neb. Natural Resources Comm'n), 64 (state- 
ment of Steve Oltmans, Lower Elkhorn m), 65 (statement of Paul Mann, Up- 
per Elkhorn NRD), 72 (statement of Me1 Sahs, Lower Platte North NRD). 
303. Governor's Bill, s u p a  note 280, $ 15, at  13 (codified as amended at NEB. REV. 
STAT. 2-15,117 (Cum. Supp. 1986)). 
304. Id  $ 16, at  14, 15 (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. $ 2-1588 (Cum. Supp. 
1986)) (transferred from NEB. REV. STAT. $ 23265 (1983)). 
305. Governor's Bill Hearing, supra note 281, at  17 (statement of John Cavanaugh, 
Water Independence Congress Co-Chairman). 
306. Regarding legal aspects of instream flows in Nebraska, see, J. AIKEN, OPPORTUNI- 
TIES FOR INSTREAM Rows IN NEBRASKA AND KANSAS (U.S. Fish & TViIdlife Ser- 
vice 1983); HARNSBERGER & TWOWON, sum note 7, at 315-20; Comment, 
Minimum StreamJkws: The Legislative A l tm t i ve s ,  57 NEB. L. REV. 704 (1978). 
307. Governor's Bill, supra note 280, 5 23, at  12,13; (codified at  NEB. REV. STAT. 9 46- 
2,108 (1984)). 
308. Id $24, at  24 (codified a t  NEB. REV. STAT. $46-2,109 (1984)). 
309. Id $ 24-25, a t  24, 25 (codified at  NEB. REV. STAT. $$ 46-2,109 to -2,110 (1984)). 
310. Id $26, at 25 (codified at  NEB. REV. STAT. $ 46-2,111(1984)) repealed by 1985 Neb. 
Laws, LB 102 $22, at  13 (1985). 
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ural flow were available for appropriation.311 If the NRC determined 
that sufficient unappropriated flow were not available, the appropria- 
tion application would be abandoned, and the NRD would instead co- 
operate with the NRDs or the Game and Parks to establish the water 
storage necessary to provide water for instream flows.312 After a pub- 
lic hearing, the DWR could grant the instream appropriation if the 
appropriation is necessary to sustain fish and wildlife, the appropria- 
tion would not interfere with senior appropriations, the rate and tim- 
ing of flow is the minimum necessary to sustain fish and wildlife, and 
the state benefits from granting the appropriation equal or outweigh 
the benefits from denying the appropriation.313 
The instream flow proposal was controversial. Developers opposed 
the concept of instream flows.314 Environmentalists were unsatisfied 
because of the cumbersome procedures required and because the 
water-development-prone NRC was the agency seeking the instream 
appropriations.315 It seemed unlikely that the NRC would seek an in- 
stream appropriation where it would conflict with a proposed water 
project. But LB 1106 generated additional controversy by inserting in- 
stream flows into the water preferences statutes,316 and failing to give 
agriculture a preference over instrearn flows. Instead the Governor's 
bill put instream flows and agriculture on an equal basis so that 
neither use could be condemned by the other.317 This provision of the 
instream flow proposal generated the most negative comments at the 
hearing on the Governor's bi11.318 The instream flow provisions of LB 
311. Id $27, at 25, 26 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. 5 46-2,112 (1984)) repealed by 1985 
Neb. Laws, LB 102 $ 22, at 26. 
312. Id  $ 28, at 26 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. 9 46-2,113 (1984)) repealed by 1985 Neb. 
Laws, LB 102 $ 22, at 13. 
313. Id. $$ 29-30 (codified at  NEB. REV. STAT. $ 8  46-2,114 to -2,115 (1984)). In making 
the state benefit determination, the DWR director \vould consider the economic, 
social and environmental value of the instrearn uses versus those of reasonably 
foreseeable out-of-stream uses. Id  at 3 31 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. $46-2,116 
(1984)). 
314. Governor's Bill Hearing, supra note 281, a t  37-38 (statement of Clinton VonSeg- 
gren, Neb. Natural Resources Comm'n). 
315. Id  at 34 (statement of Francis Moul, Neb. Wildlife Federation), 52 (statement of 
Phil James, Neb. Water Conservation Council). 
316. Water preferences are one of the most misunderstood features of prior appropria- 
tion. The surface water preference ordering in Nebraska prefers domestic over 
all other uses, and agricultural uses are preferred over industrial and manufac- 
turing uses. The legal effect of a preference is that a junior preferred user (i.e., a 
junior appropriator with a higher preference) can condemn a senior inferior use 
(i.e., a senior appropriation for a less preferred purpose). Most do not understand 
that exercising a preference involves compensating the inferior user. See NEB. 
NATURAL RESOURCES COMM'N, PREFERENCES TO THE USE OF WATER (1981); 
Fischer, Harnsberger & Oeltjen, supra note 12, at  356-57. 
317. Governor's Bill, supra note 280, $ 34, a t  28, 29. 
318. Govwnor's Bill Hearing, supra note 283, at  57 (statement of Bryce Neidig, Neb. 
Farm Bureau), 60 (statement of Rich Martin, Neb. Ass'n of Commerce & Indus- 
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1106 were substantially revised in the Committee amendments. 
The last component of the Governor's bill required all NRDs in 
which ground water control or management areas had not already 
been designated to prepare ground water management plans by Janu- 
ary 1, 1986.319 AS discussed earlier, the purpose of the plan was to 
identify any likely ground water depletion or pollution problems and 
to identify what regulations would be necessary. On the one hand, LB 
1106 stopped short of requiring NRDs facing ground water depletion 
to establish effective control programs as a condition of state financial 
support for rescue projects. However, requiring all NRDs to prepare 
the plans was a significant step away from the traditional local control 
approach to ground water management. The proposal was opposed 
only by the NRC, which preferred a more modest program requiring 
NRDs to inventory existing supplies and concerns, but stop short of 
considering alternatives to deal with those concerns.320 
The &ernor's bill was a significant water policy proposal of his- 
toric proportions. The mTMB's project review authorities would ide- 
ally allow project disputes to be resolved prior to obtaining an 
appropriation, thus avoiding costly environmental and water rights lit- 
igation. The instream flow provisions held the promise that environ- 
mental values could be protected through instream appropriations and 
would not need to be raised on a project by project basis through en- 
dangered species or section 404 litigation. However, LB 1106 con- 
tained significant gaps and created new problems. The status of 
proposed projects for which appropriations had already been sought 
vis-a-vis the WMB was ambiguous. While project sponsors presuma- 
bly would be required to apply for WMB approval to obtain state plan- 
ning, financial or advocacy assistance, the provision giving them the 
option of ignoring WMB approval if they had already filed with the 
DWR clouded this. Moreover, the WMB's authority to consult and 
make determinations with the Game and Parks Commission regarding 
endangered species unnecessarily suggested that jeopardy determina- 
tions \dl be made jointly by the WMB and the Game and Parks 
rather than by Game and Parks alone. Finally, the instream appropri- 
ation requirements made the protection accorded to environmental 
values in water more illusory than real. It seems unlikely that envi- 
ronmental interests would forego delaying litigation in the hope that 
try). The controversy over the instream flow preferences reflected the general 
misunderstanding of the preferences concept, as was correctly recognized by 
John Cavanaugh. Id a t  12-13. That is, junior agricultural users were unlikely to 
be able to afford to condemn senior instream uses and vice versa unless Game and 
Parks were authorized to condemn senior appropriations for instream purposes. 
319. Governor's Bill, supra note 280, § 36, a t  32 (codified a t  NEB. REV. STAT. 46-673.01 
(1984)). 
320. G w v m ' s  Bill Hearing, supra note 281, at  31 (statement of Clinton VonSeggren, 
Neb. Natural Resources Comm'n). 
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the state's water development agency would obtain an instream 
appropriation. 
C. The Committee's Bill 
Controversy over the organizational changes proposed in the Gov- 
ernor's bill and continuing irrigator opposition to instream flows led to 
significant committee amendments and an unusual second public 
hearing. The committee amendments modified the DNR appointment 
procedures, expanded the WMB membership, removed the prefer- 
ences language for instream flows, added a take-away provision for 
instream flows, and provided funding for ground water management 
plan preparation.321 
The Governor's bill would have allowed the Governor to appoint 
the DNR subject to NRC confirmation. The Committee bill proposed 
instead that the NRC would present the Governor with a list of at 
least five nominees from which the Governor would make his choice. 
The DNR would serve at the pleasure of the Governor, and could not 
be removed by the NRC.322 This modification was opposed by the 
NRC and NRDs, as was the original DNR provision.323 
The Committee bill expanded the membership of the WMB. Under 
the Governor's bill the WMB would have included the director of 
Game and Parks, the DNR, and a gubernatorial appointment with 
demonstrated natural resources experience. The Committee bill ex- 
panded the WMB to include the director of the Conservation and Sur- 
vey Division of the University of Nebraska, the Game and Parks 
director, the DNR, and two gubernatorial appointees, both with natu- 
ral resources experience and one an expert in water project develop- 
ment and management.324 There was no remaining opposition to the 
WMB.325 
321. NRDs could apply for state funds if the costs of ground water management plan 
preparation exceeded 25% of the operating budget for the district. Committee on 
Public Works, Committee Amendments to LB 1106 sec. 37 (AM2257,1984) [here- 
inafter Committee Bill]; cf: NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-673.01 (1984). 
322. Id 3 12 (codified at  NEB. REV. STAT. $215,108). If the governor did not make the 
DNR appointment within 45 days of the receipt of the NRC list, the NRC would 
make the appointment. If the NRC did not submit a list of nominees to the gov- 
ernor within 45 days, the governor would make the appointment. Id  
323. Committee on Public Works, LB 1106 Committee Amendments Hearing (Feb. 23, 
1984) at 46 (statement of Gordon Kissel, Neb. Ass'n of Resources Districts), 47-48 
(statement of Clinton VonSeggren, Neb. Natural Resources Comm'n), 50 (state- 
ment of Wayne Warner, North Platte NRD), 55-56 (statement of Ken Regier, 
Upper Big Blue NRD), 66-67 (statement of Don Hood, Nemaha NRD) [hereinaf- 
ter Committee Bill Hearing]. 
324. Committee Bill, supra note 321, 8 2 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-15,108 (Cum. 
Supp. 1986)). 
325. Committee Bill Hearing, supra note 323, a t  45 (statement of Gordon Kissel, Neb. 
Ass'n of Resources Districts). 
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The instream flow provision of the Committee bill added a take- 
away provision to render the potential instream appropriations even 
more insecure. Under the Committee bill, the WMB would be re- 
quired to review instream appropriations if the appropriations poten- 
tially interfered with an irrigation project submitted for WMl3 review. 
The WMB would determine whether the interest of the state required 
modification of the instream appropriation. The DWR would be au- 
thorized to legally modify the instream appropriation as recom- 
mended by the WMB, although the DWR director could elect not to 
modify the appropriation. Modification could include reducing the vol- 
ume or rate approved for the instream appropriation.326 This provi- 
sion largely nullified whatever instream flow protection could be 
obtained through an instream appropriation, and reflected the contin- 
uing hostility to instream flows on the part of water development in- 
terests. The take-away provisions were opposed by environmental 
groups.327 The Committee bill also did not include the instream flow 
preference provision of the Governor's bi11.328 
The Committee amendments made the Governor's bill more ac- 
ceptable to water development interests, and in so doing made LB 
1106 less attractive to environmentalists.329 Opposition by water de- 
velopers (and by Senator Schmit) probably could have killed any 
chance of enactment, so the Committee amendments probably were 
politically necessary to get a bill enacted. 
The Unicameral enacted the Committee bill, and added water pro- 
ject revenue bonding.330 The final bill gave the DNR rather than the 
326, Committee BQE, supm note 321, $34 (codified at  NEB. REV. STAT. 3 46-2,117 
(1984)). 
327. Committee Bill Hearing, supra note 323, at  17 (statement of Mike Dennis, Neb. 
Water Conservation Council). Natural flow instream flow appropriations were 
opposed by the Nebraska Water Resources Association, a water development as- 
sociation. Id at 34 (statement of Jack Odgaard). 
328. Committee Bill, supra note 321, $ 35 (codified at  NEB. REV. STAT. 3 46-2,119 
(1984)). 
329. The Nebraska environmental lobby has never been strong, in part because no 
commercial interests are served thereby. Indeed, the Water Congress and LB 
1106 would have ignored instream flows completely were not environmental val- 
ues protected through the federal 5 404 and FESA programs. If Nebraska had 
instream appropriations which protected significant environmental values 8 404, 
NESA, and FESA litigation over water projects would be sharply reduced. If in- 
stream flows had greater commercial significance, e.g., for outdoor recreation, 
Nebraska probably would have had instream flow legislation years ago. 
330. 1984 Neb. Laws, LB 1106,88th Leg., 2d Sess. The revenue bonding program is at $3 44-71 (codified at  NEB. REV. STAT. $9 24501 to -4528 (Cum. Supp. 1986)). Reve- 
nue bonding allows project operators to issue bonds based on future project reve- 
nues, such as from water sales to irrigators. Water project revenue bonds were 
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NRC the responsibility for establishing state water use goals, with 
which the WMB would evaluate proposed water projects.331 The final 
bill substituted a $10 million figure for the water diversion volume 
requirements as the project size threshold for WMB project review 
authority.332 The purposes for which instream appropriations could 
be acquired were broadened from fish and wildlife to also include 
recreation.333 
The WMB project review function was amended in 1985 to require 
existing projects seeking state advocacy for federal construction fund- 
ing, or Water Management Fund planning or construction grants to be 
reviewed by the WMB.334 This provision brought existing projects 
within the WMB's jurisdiction, although the point at which that oc- 
curred could apparently be delayed as long as state water planning 
assistance was not requested. Under this amendment, projects for 
which appropriations had been filed prior to the effective date of LB 
1106, February 15, 1985,335 need not apply for WMB approval until 
they request state planning assistance, which could be delayed until 
after project water rights had been obtained from the DWR.336 If they 
forego state planning assistance altogether, project sponsors with pre- 
LB 1106 appropriation filings need file with the WMB only when they 
request state construction grants or state advocacy for federal con- 
struction grants, which would occur long after project water rights 
had been obtained.337 The result is that the WMB will not review 
projects with pre-LB 1106 appropriation filings before the project ap- 
propriations are considered by the DWR, but will review all post-LB 
1106 projects before project sponsors can file with the DWR for water 
appropriations. All major Platte River projects have pre-LB 1106 ap- 
authorized by constitutional amendment in 1982. NEB. CON ST.^^^. XI11 $ 1 (1985). 
Revenue bonds do not represent direct public subsidies of water projects. 
331. 1984 Neb. Laws, LB 1106, 88th Leg., 2d Sess. 3 7 (codified as amended at NEB. 
REV. STAT. $ 2-15,113(1) (Cum. Supp. 1986)). Section 5 215,113 was amended in 
1985; the DNR proposes state water use goals to the NRC, which accepts, modi- 
fies, or rejects them. See 1985 Neb. Laws, LB 102,89th Leg., 1st Sess. 5. The NRC 
may also request the DNR to modify the state water use goals. I d  (codified at 
NEB. REV. STAT. 5 2-15,113(2) (Cum. Supp. 1986)). 
332. I d  8 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. $ 2-15,114(1) (Cum. Supp. 1986)). 
333. I d  $ 24 (codified at  NEB. REV. STAT. $ 46-2,108 ( Cum. Supp. 1986)). However, the 
DWR director may consider municipal ground water recharge and water quality 
maintenance from instream flows in considering instream appropriation applica- 
tions. I d  5 32(1) (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. $ 46-2,116(1) (Cum. Supp. 1986)). 
334. 1985 Neb. Laws, LB 1106, 88th Leg., 1st Sess. @5,6  (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. 
$$ 2-15,114(2), 15,116(2) (Cum. Supp. 1986)). A less formal WMB project review is 
required to obtain state advocacy for federal planning funds. I d  5 2-15,116(3). 
However, pre-LB 1106 projects routineIy obtain state advocacy for federal plan- 
ning assistance without first obtaining $ 2-15,116(3) WMB approval. 
335. I d  3 72. 
336. NEB. REV. STAT. $2-15,114(1) (Cum. Supp. 1986). 
337. I d  5 2-15,116(2). 
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propriation filings.338 Thus, the result of the 1985 amendment is to 
clearly signal that the WMB will be on the sidelines during the cur- 
rent Platte River wars unless project sponsors voluntarily submit to 
WMB project review pursuant to section 2-15,144(3), or the DWR vol- 
untarily refers appropriation applications to the WMB pursuant to 
section 46-209. Neither action is likely, so the WMB will be merely a 
paper tiger. 
The instream flow provisions were also amended in 1985 to delete 
the NRC instream flow study requirements339 and to authorize the 
Game and Parks Commission and NRDs to apply for instrearn appro- 
priations rather than the NRC.340 However, the take-away provisions 
remain, as well as the restrictions that natural flow instream appropri- 
ations may be granted only if sufficient unappropriated natural flow is 
available to completely satisfy the instream flow requirements.341 
VI. NEW DIRECTIONS IN NEBRASKA WATER POLICY? 
LB 1106 represented a good faith political attempt to establish a 
mechanism to resolve the environmental and water rights controver- 
sies attending Platte River development. However, the water project 
management system it established is unlikely ultimately to succeed. 
Water developers insist (1) that local control be preserved, (2)  that 
instream flows be accommodated only when they would not limit 
water development options, (3) that significant state funding be pro- 
vided for water projects with no conditions, and (4) that ground water 
regulations not be established. These values are reflected throughout 
LB 1106. Until these positions change, there will be no progress in 
reaching a broader consensus on Platte River water allocation, and de- 
cisions will continue to be made through litigation. Political leaders 
should persuade water developers that they must accommodate a 
broader set of political and environmental values in order to accom- 
plish their objectives. If they fail to do so, developers run the risk that 
when they finally succumb to current fiscal, environmental, and polit- 
338. See P L A m  PROJEC~S U M ~ M Y ,  supra note 226. 
339. NEB. REV. STAT. §$ 46-2,111 to -2,113 (1984) (repealed by 1985 Neb. Laws, LB 102 
6 22). 
340. i985 Neb. Laws, LB 102 $15 (codified at  NEB. REV. STAT. 5 2-1,110 (Cum. Supp. 
1986)). 
341. This means that instrearn appropriations must either be satisfied completely 
from natural flow or completely from storage. Natural flow instream appropria- 
tions cannot be issued where the flows come both from natural flow and from 
storage. This curious legal discrimination against instream appropriations makes 
no sense at  all: all modern irrigation projects depend on both natural flow and 
stored water to meet their water supply objectives. Precluding instream appro- 
priations to be met both from natural flow and stored water is only another ex- 
ample of the legislative hostility to instream flows. 
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ical realities via the blunt instruments of litigation and political defeat, 
it will be too late to salvage any of their original objectives. 
The more significant issue is whether a rescue project policy, the 
preservation of which was the major objective of LB 1106, is itself 
doomed to failure. If water developers do become more politically ac- 
commodating in order to realize some of their objectives, will they 
have achieved anything substantial? The answer is no: a policy of 
ground water management policy through impoundment will provide 
water to only a small fraction of those irrigators facing depletion. This 
does not mean, however, that LB 1106 and the public policy issues it 
represents are of no consequence. Rather, policy makers must be 
careful to guard against impoundment policies that unnecessarily 
jeopardize our environment and threaten our state's financial capaci- 
ties, while failing to significantly extend the life of ground water- 
based irrigation in Nebraska. 
A. Director of Natural Resources: Gubernatorial Involvement in Water 
Policy Making 
The only significant legislative challenge to LB 1106 has been the 
passage of LB 778 in 1986. Under LB 778, the DNR would have been 
appointed by the NR.C rather than the Governor. Governor Kerrey 
vetoed LB 778, thus preserving the governor's more direct involve- 
ment in state water policy making.342 The passage of LB 778 reflects 
the strong political sentiment in favor of local control. Yet insistence 
on local control ignores the fact that if the Governor is not directly 
involved in water development policy making, he will not be willing to 
support the appropriations necessary to build water projects. Water 
developers are unwilling to accept that local responsibility comes with 
local control-if local irrigators are unwilling to forego local control 
over water development policies they must be ready to finance water 
development themselves. At this point, irrigators have not accepted 
that responsibility. They insist on maintaining local political control 
over water development decisions but expect the state to provide 
whatever funding is needed to accomplish these local objectives. If 
local control parochialism is allowed to dominate water policy deci- 
sions, water project development in Nebraska will not occur. If water 
developers expect significant state financial support for water 
projects, they will have to relinquish local control over water develop- 
ment policies and begin to view water issues in a less parochial 
fashion. 
342. NEB. LEG. J. 1864 (1986). The bill originally proposing to give the DNR appoint- 
ment authority to the NRC was LB 920, which was added to LB 778 by floor 
amendment. 
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B. Water Management Board: Accommodating Competing Projects 
and Values 
Under L B  1106 projects with pre-LB 1106 appropriation filings are 
grandfathered out of WMl3 water project review. Neither the DWR 
nor grandfathered project sponsors have shown any indication to sub- 
mit to WR/IB project review.343 Unless the Governor can persuade the 
parties to submit to WMJ3 arbitration, or unless LB 1106 is amended, 
the WMB will have no significant role in the current Platte River 
water war. 
A recent University of Nebraska study indicates what optimally 
could be achieved with mTMB water project review. The study evalu- 
ated differing water allocations to the Central Platte, Little Blue, and 
Upper Big Blue projects (the three major Platte River project propos- 
als), plus maintenance of instream flows. The study concluded that 
maximum economic benefits would occur if all three projects could be 
built at a smaller scale than currently proposed.344 This conclusion 
supports the notion that a negotiated settlement on the Platte would 
yield greater irrigation benefits than would the project-by-project de- 
termination which is currently occurring. The study also concluded 
that the environmental-irrigation trade-offs would be less than is gen- 
erally presumed; while the instream flow regimes defined by the 
Game and Parks Comm?ssion as necessary to avoid jeopardy would 
reduce the water available for diversion, the economic benefits lost 
would be relatively small.345 If this is recognized by developers, the 
likelihood for a negotiated settlement between environmental inter- 
ests and developers improves. Finally, the study estimated that con- 
structing the projects could be financed by user fees if irrigators and 
ground water recharge beneficiaries were charged between 30-60% of 
the economic benefits received. Capital construction needs could be 
met through relatively modest annual appropriations of less than $15 
million annually, solely through revenue bonds, or through a combi- 
nation of the two.346 While the results from the Platte River study are 
almost too good to be true, they do suggest that compromises are avail- 
able that would accommodate most, if not all, competing values. The 
possibility of such alternatives suggest that WMB arbitration should 
be pursued if developers and policy makers truly wish to develop the 
Platte. 
However, even in the best of circumstances, Platte River develop- 
343. The possibility exists, however, that the parties could negotiate a compromise pri- 
vately and then submit the compromise to the WMB for ratification. 
344. A. BLEED, N. GOUEHON, D. RAZAVYLN & R. SUPALLA, ECONOMIC, ENVIRONMEN- 
TAL AND FINANCING OPTIMIZATION ANALYSIS OF PJA?TE RIVER DEVELOPR~ENT 
ALTERNATIVES 161 (Univ. of Neb. Conservation & Survey Div., June 1986). 
345. Id at 162. 
346. Id at 163-65. 
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ment would be extremely controversial. Major water project develop- 
ment was intensely controversial long before endangered species 
considerations appeared on the water policy horizon. The opponents 
to Tri-County development, the last major Platte River water war, 
were competing project sponsors, downstream water interests, and lo- 
cal landowners facing condemnation. Much of this opposition is an 
inescapable part of major water project development. However, 
forced project negotiations through the WMB could resolve many of 
the environmental disputes and intra-project disputes. If only that 
were accomplished, it probably would be enough to insure implemen- 
tation of the compromise. 
C. Water Management Fund: Financing Water Development 
While the WMB is authorized to provide up to 75% funding for 
major water projects from the Water Management Fund, the fund it- 
self is empty. Thus, a major issue is how the state will obtain the 
funding necessary either to qualify for federal water project cost shar- 
ing assistance, or to finance projects on its own. Projects could be 
funded on a project-by-project basis. This would force a project-by- 
project appraisal, a broader political accommodation of state-wide in- 
terests, and probably would make project financing more difficult. It 
is difficult to imagine the Nebraska Unicameral approving a direct 
water project appropriation for $150 to $300 million in the near future. 
A second approach is to earmark funds, e.g., a one-percent sales 
tax, for water development. Again, with the current financial difficul- 
ties in the agricultural community it is difficult to imagine the Uni- 
cameral authorizing a state-wide tax to help only a relatively few 
agricultural producers. This approach would also bypass the political 
scrutiny entailed in direct legislative appropriations for each project. 
A third approach, as suggested in the University of Nebraska 
Platte River study, would be revenue bonds. This option is already 
available, and would be the fairest way to finance projects since they 
would be paid for primarily through user fees. Agriculture would 
need to be more profitable than it is now, however, for this approach 
to make economic sense. 
The absence of a funding mechanism is no real hindrance to water 
development. It would be foolish to undergo the political cost in- 
volved in adopting a water financing mechanism when development is 
still the subject of intense litigation and debate with little sign of com- 
promise or consensus. 
D. Instream Flows and Endangered Species 
A basic cause of the current Platte River water wars is the failure 
of the Nebraska appropriation system to reliably allocate water to in- 
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stream uses. If Nebraska's appropriation system included recognition 
of instream uses, NESA, FESA, and section 404 litigation would be 
less of a threat to water project implementation. If instream uses are 
not accommodated in water development proposals, water projects 
will be subject to costly, disruptive and delaying environmental litiga- 
tion at state and federal levels. 
An interesting question is whether NESA will ultimately be inter- 
preted by the Nebraska Supreme Court as limiting appropriations. In 
Little Blue N Chief Justice Krivosha suggested in dictum that the 
jeopardy provisions of NESA might interfere with the state constitu- 
tional right to divert unappropriated water in Nebraska.347 This dic- 
tum ignores the fact that the constitutional right to divert conditioned 
by the public interest, which could be defined in part through 
NESA.348 However, in view of the source, the suggestion that the 
NESA jeopardy provision may be unconstitutional is worth exploring. 
If section 37-435(3) is unconstitutional as applied to appropriation 
of unappropriated water, then the endangered species issue would 
merely be deferred to the federal level. When project sponsors apply 
for a section 404 permit they will face the same endangered species 
issues they had managed to avoid at the state level. Project sponsors 
might expect to receive an endangered species exemption, but that 
would require at least, a good faith effort on the part of project spon- 
sors to avoid jeopardy, something project sponsors have been loath to 
do to date.349 If, however, section 37-435(3) is interpreted as prohibit- 
ing appropriations that jeopardize endangered species or their critical 
habitat, water developers would likely propose to either repeal NESA 
or to amend it to include an exemption process. If the exemption pro- 
cess were modeled after the federal system, project sponsors would 
still be required to make a good faith effort to avoid jeopardy and to 
mitigate habitat disruption they caused. 
A recent DWR ruling, which will lead to Little Blue 111, suggests 
that NESA indeed may not significantly influence Platte River appro- 
priation decisions. In that order, the DWR director determined that 
the effect of the Little Blue project on endangered species habitat was 
not significant, despite the Game and Parks opinion to the contrary.350 
WEde a thorough analysis of this order is beyond the scope of this 
Article, it is worth noting that treating the Game and Parks Commis- 
sion as a witness and its biological opinion as mere testimony probably 
347. Little Blue Natural Resources Dist. v. Lower Platte North Natural Resources 
Dist., 210 Neb. 862, 874, 317 N.W.2d 726,733 (1982). 
348. NEB. CONST. art. XV, $6.  
349. Regarding the FESA exemption process, see supra text accompanying notes 176- 
86. 
350. In re Applications A-15145, A-15146, A-15147 & A-15148 assigned to the Cather- 
land Reclamation District, Dept. of Water Resources, July 29, 1986 (order of 
approval). 
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does not constitute consultation as required by section 37-435(3).351 
E. Ground Water Management v. Rescue Projects 
One of the underlying justifications for LB 1106's aggressive sup- 
port of surface water development is the notion that impoundments 
("rescue projects") are needed to sustain ground water based irriga- 
tion in the face of ground water depletion. This justification assumes 
that most if not all of current ground water irrigation development 
can be maintained through rescue projects. This assertion does not 
bear close scrutiny. 
University of Nebraska scientist Ray Bentall has estimated that ap- 
proximately 300,000 acre feet of Platte river water are reliably avail- 
able for development.352 However, this is far  less than the major 
projects propose to use. Prairie Bend-Twin Valley would use 387,100 
acre feet, Landmark would use 300,000 acre feet and Catherland 
would use 125,000 acre feet.353 Even assuming that only half the water 
impounded is consumed through evapotranspiration and other una- 
voidable losses, this is still far less water than is available. One under- 
stands why project sponsors are competing so vigorously for project 
appropriations. 
Moreover, the High Plains Study estimates that in the central 
Platte and Blue River basins approximately 788,000 ground water irri- 
gated acres will revert to dryland production by 2020 if ground water 
withdrawals are not regulated.354 Even if all three proposed major 
projects are fully implemented they will supply water only for an esti- 
mated 272,000 acres, far less than the total loss of irrigated acres for 
the region. The number of acres converted from ground water irriga- 
tion water supply to impounded surface water supply is even less: 
176,000 acres. Thus full irrigation development of the Platte, if that 
were possible, would supply supplemental water for less than a quar- 
ter of the areas threatened with reversion to dryland production. The 
supply benefits of these three major projects, at an estimated cost of 
$827.5 million, are much less than is generally appreciated.355 
351. Moreover, in discussing the possible effect of the project on the endangered 
whooping crane the order notes the lack of specific information gauging the ef- 
fects of flow reductions on crane habitat, but nonetheless concludes that it is "in- 
conceivable" that the Little Blue project would affect the whooping crane or its 
critical habitat. Id at 10,15. While this candor is refreshing, it probably does not 
measure up to the DWR director's duty to insure no jeopardy. NEB. REV. STAT. 
37-435(3). 
352. R. BENTALL, NEBRASKA'S PLATE RIVER: A GRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF news 45 
(Univ. of Neb. Conservation & Survey Div. Neb. Water Paper 45, July 1982). 
353. NEBRASKA NATURAL RESOURCES COMMISSION, PLATI'E RIVER FORUM FOR THE 
FUTURE 20 (Jan. 1985). 
354. HIGH PLAINS STUDY, supra note 212, at 28. 
355. A. BLEED, N. GOLLEHON, D. RAZAVIAN & R. SUPALLA, supra note 344, at 135,116- 
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Ironically, a policy of regulating ground water withdrawals could 
make an impoundment policy more successful. The High Plains Study 
estimated that the number of irrigated acres reverting to dryland in 
the central Platte-Blue River region would fall from 788,000 to 
310,000, a 61% reduction, if ground water withdrawals were reduced 
3076.356 This would significantly reduce the gap between irrigated 
acres lost to depletion and irrigated acres maintained by impound- 
ment. In this writer's opinion the "need" for water projects would be 
significantly reduced if not obviated by strict ground water regula- 
tions. However, this alternative has not yet received serious policy 
consideration. 
The belief that Nebraska can prevent the reversion of thousands of 
acres to dryland production through impoundment alone is an expen- 
sive mirage. Only through significant restrictions on irrigation ground 
water withdrawals can a sustainable level of irrigation be established. 
Focusing on this issue, rather than how impoundment projects can be 
implemented and financed, would better serve Nebraska's long range 
water policy interests. 
24, estimate that the total cost of economically and environmentally feasible 
water projects would be less, as would be the total irrigation water supply 
benefits. 
356. HIGH PLAINS STUDY, supra note 212, at 28. 
